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ENRICHING THE LAND OR THE POLITICAL ELITE?
LESSONS FROM CHINA ON DEMOCRATIZATION OF
THE URBAN RENEWAL PROCESS
Pamela N. Phan
t
Abstract: As China in the twenty-first century rushes ahead in its quest to become
more developed and cosmopolitan, the poor are increasingly cast as outsiders to the
nation's new social contract and urban development politics. Nowhere is the contrast
between China's urban rich and rural poor as stark as on the land itself. In cities
throughout China, land continues to be taken away from the collective and placed into the
hands of an increasingly rich and powerful elite. As a new society built upon urban
poverty, exclusion, and inequality emerges, and the gap between rich and poor widens,
the new political order must wrestle with questions of how to balance the interests of
government regulators, business elite and the average citizen, while minimizing social
tensions arising over land disputes. Current reforms ignore the real issues-which include
the need for the governing regime to define and recognize the property rights of the
individual. By clinging to the political rhetoric of demolition and renewal in the "public
interest," paving the way for corrupt officials and land-hungry developers to render
thousands homeless and landless, China's government continues to operate urban renewal
as a "top-down" process. This Article focuses on the current state of economic
development in China, and the crisis in governance that it has created, questioning
whether increased urbanization necessarily signifies progress in an environment in which
the voices of a significant fraction of the population are left out.
I. INTRODUCTION
In late February 2003, residents of an economic and technological
development zone in Wuhan, China, received notification from the local
street committee that they would be evicted and their homes demolished!
By September 2003, failing to reach an agreement on the resettlement and
compensation terms, the local residents' committee proceeded with forced
t Yale-China Legal Education Fellow and Visiting Scholar at Wuhan University School of Law,
2004-2005, and Northwest University of Politics and Law, 2005. The Yale-China Association ("Yale-
China") is a nonprofit, nongovernmental organization that contributes to the development of education in
and about China. While closely affiliated with the Yale community, Yale-China is separately incorporated
and administered from Yale University. All observations and analyses are the author's own and by no
means reflect the views of Yale-China or its affiliates. The inspiration for this Article grew out of the
author's work and assistance handling cases through the general legal clinic at Wuhan University and the
public interest legal clinic at Northwest University. The content has benefited greatly from discussions
with faculty and students at both institutions, who dedicated their time and interest to the human rights and
property courses taught by the author.
See Xingzheng Qisuzhuang [Administrative Bill of Complaint] (Apr. 26, 2004) (on file with
Journal) [hereinafter Bill of Complaint]. For reasons of confidentiality, details related to client and
property location names have been omitted.
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eviction, cutting off such basic necessities as water and electricity.2  Two
months later, the street committee, together with the city planning and land
administration bureau, arrived onsite to forcibly and violently remove all
residents, leaving dozens of families homeless, landless and without
compensation for their seized property. 3 The residents took their
complaints to the central government in Beijing, but were placed under
house arrest and sent back to Wuhan, devoid of compensation or any
resolution at all.4
This is a story that has replayed itself over and over again, in
numerous and varied regions all throughout the People's Republic of China
("China" or "PRC"). As China continues to grow economically at an
average annual rate of about ten percent, and rapid urbanization is leading to
larger cities, 5 multiplying development zones 6 and more opulent
commercial malls and multiplexes, the poor are increasingly cast as
outsiders to the nation's new social contract and urban development politics.
Nowhere is the contrast between China's urban rich and rural poor as
stark as on the land itself. In city after city, local government has asserted
its power of eminent domain to take land away from the common collective
and place it into the hands of an increasingly rich and powerful elite.7 The
result has been the emergence of a new society built upon urban poverty,
exclusion and inequality. The challenge faced by the Chinese leadership in
this new society is to appropriately balance the interests of government
regulators, business elite and the average citizen, while minimizing social
tensions arising over land disputes. The more opulent the house that China
builds, the more imperative the need for its leadership to focus on laying this
crucial foundation.
China is certainly not the only country in the twenty-first century to
have bulldozed its way toward becoming ever more developed and
2 See id.
3 See id.
4 See Wuhan, FalOi Zhensuo [Notes of the Author] (Apr. 8, 2004) (on file with Journal) (taken
during a meeting with clients at Wuhan University Center for Protection of Rights of Disadvantaged
Citizens in Wuhan, China) [hereinafter Spring Notes].
5 See Tingwei Zhang, Urban Development and a Socialist Pro-Growth Coalition in Shanghai, 37
URBAN AFFAIRS REv. 475, 480-81 (2002) [hereinafter Zhang, Urban Development] (showing an increase in
the urban population to account for a total thirty-four percent of the overall population, as well as an
increase in the number of cities, from 381 in 1987 to 668 in 1998).6 The Ministry of Land and Resources ("MLR") quoted a total of 6866 development zones in China
by the end of July 2004. See Zhao Xiaojian, New Policy Tackles Land Management Bottleneck, available
at http://www.cajing.com.cn/english/2004/041101/041101new-policy.htm (last visited June 8, 2005)
[hereinafter New Policy]. These cities, or sections of cities, grew out of the Chinese central government's
attcmpt to turn what used to be countryside and farmland into areas for urban and industrial growth.
See, e.g., discussion infra Part III (providing several such case studies).
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cosmopolitan.8  The story of forced eviction and seizure of land has been
scripted into the development of many urban, cosmopolitan societies
worldwide, including that of the United States. 9 In fact, currently pending
before the U.S. Supreme Court is a case in which the residents of the Fort
Trumbull neighborhood of New London, Connecticut-much like the
Wuhan residents-are being evicted in part to make way for a high-
technology research and development project. 10 In October 2000, after
months of unsuccessful negotiations with a number of the residents, the city
council authorized the responsible development corporation to use the power
of eminent domain to acquire their properties." In November 2000, the
development corporation filed condemnation proceedings, and the residents
12have fought back by bringing an action to challenge the condemnations.
Cities all over the world, despite being at different stages of
development, are in this way building and rebuilding themselves in the new
millennium. In focusing on China's current state of economic development
and the crisis in governance that has been created, this Article questions
whether increased urbanization necessarily signifies progress in an
environment in which the voices of a significant fraction of the population
are left out. It proposes that land is a site of contestation over economic,
social and cultural rights-not only in China, but everywhere from the
United States to the nations of Africa. In doing so, it seeks to emphasize
that each and every nation, whether developing or developed, has much to
learn from the battles being fought over land elsewhere.
Part II of this Article provides some background on the existing
Chinese property regime, including Chinese legal jurisprudence on the
notion of property rights and from where those rights are derived. After
examining the administrative maze and complex cast of characters that
plague the governing system, this Article moves on in Part III to evaluate
China's approach to reform of its property rights infrastructure. This is
8 As recently as late last year, in the already "developed" nation of France, the redesign of public
space and remaking of the old Les Halles district in Paris similarly brought to light the fragility of the urban
renewal process. See generally Eric Pape, France: Paris Rising, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 16, 2004, available at
http:/www.msnbc.msn.comid/5635502/site/newsweek/ (last visited June 8, 2005). Multiple competing
interests hung in the balance, and Parisian Mayor Bertrand Delanoe was careful to build his ambitions for
the city on the grassroots support and consensus he sought out in advance. See id.
9 Architectural history and urban planning scholars have noted the inequalities in the U.S. urban
renewal process during the 1950s and 1960s. For a comparative analysis, see generally Yan Zhang & Ke
Fang, Is History Repeating Itself? From Urban Renewal in the United States to Inner-City Redevelopment
in China, 23 J. PLANNING EDUC. & RESEARCH 286 (2004).
'o See Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500 (Conn. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 27 (U.S.
Sept. 28, 2004) (No. 04-108).
Id. at510-11.
IS Id. at 511.
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accomplished through an examination of three separate studies of conflict
and crisis over land-and the rush of reform measures meant to deal with
each. In Part IV, this Article then argues that current reforms ignore the
real issues-which include the need for the governing regime to define and
recognize the property rights of the individual. By clinging to the political
rhetoric of demolition and renewal in the "public interest," thereby paving
the way for corrupt government officials and land-hungry developers to
render thousands homeless and landless, China's government continues to
operate urban renewal as a "top-down" process. The result has been a
wave of mass riots and social unrest that have at their root dissatisfaction
with the very process.
As tensions escalate and the governing leadership searches for "quick
fixes" to the surge of protests and grievances over land seizures and forced
evictions, there is an urgent need for a new property rights regime built on
the potential for democratization of China's urban renewal process. Part V
proposes that true reform should focus less on outcome-based solutions and
more on organizational-based solutions, helping to establish a process that is
more transparent, consistent, and equitably applied. Ultimately, this Article
hopes to propose a new model of governance that is more than just a "quick
fix" and helps to reaffirm what is truly meant by the "public interest" and
participatory democracy.
II. INTRODUCTION TO THE CHINESE PROPERTY REGIME
To understand the context within which conflict over land has erupted
in China, it is important to understand the ways in which land has
traditionally been valued and land ownership regarded. In 2004, the
Chinese government passed amendments to the Constitution introducing not
only newly established property rights, but also the protection of human
rights and social security rights.' 3  Upon initial impression, such legal
reform might be read to afford a greater guarantee of protection to the poor
and disadvantaged in society. Read against the backdrop of property rights
jurisprudence under the Chinese Communist Party (the "Party" or "CCP"),
however, it leaves unanswered the question whether these rights can be
realistically enforced in a manner consistent with the governing ideology.
13 See, e.g., ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO XIANFA XIUZHENGAN [AMENDMENTS To THE PRC
CONSTITUTION] art. 10 (providing for compensation in the event that land is expropriated), art. 13
(protecting private property, but conditioning the right of citizens to own and inherit private property on
applicable law and confirming that private property may be expropriated by the State), art. 14 (adding
specific language endorsing the concept that the State should establish a social security system), and art. 33
(adding the general concept that the state protects human rights) (2004).
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A. The Significance of Land and Land Use Rights
1. Whose Land Is It Anyway? State as Landowner vs. State as Agent
In a society such as China's, built upon Marxist doctrine, 14 the means
of production must be controlled by the State in order for society as a whole
to achieve the ideals of communism. 15 The Marxist vision is that the
communist party, which functions as the vanguard of the working class, will
help lead the masses toward a socialist society in which private ownership of
the means of production is abolished and the economically and politically
dominant thus cease to oppress the working majority. 16  State control over
land, which is not only a factor of production, but also a critical natural
resource, is particularly crucial to the success of this socialist revolution.
17
This is the case because "[n]othing is ... so closely connected with the wordSn,,18
property as land, especially so in China, with its large peasant population.
Original Marxist doctrine holds that land is not a commodity and that
it has no exchange value because it exists naturally and is not the product of
labor.' 9 In keeping with such doctrine, the Chinese government initially
maintained rigid control over land and avoided assuming the status of
landowner by leasing it out.2 0  Land policy established that the State and
the Party would instead act as guardians over the general populace, holding
the means of production in trust, on behalf of the masses, and protecting
them from exploitation by the landowning class.
2 1
The Chinese leadership eventually reinterpreted Marx's writings
during the 1980s, recognizing that urban land can in fact have exchange
value arising from transformation of its use in an urban economy.22  As
long as land had value, the State could grant rights in exchange for payment
equal to the value of the transformed land. Even though such a reading of
Marx commodified use rights in the land, it did not commodify the land
"4 See ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO XIANFA [PRC CONSTITUTION] prmbl., para. 7 (1982)
(incorporating Marxism-Leninism as one of the nation's guiding ideologies) [hereinafter XIANFA].
See Jonas Alsen, An Introduction to Chinese Property Law, 20 MD. J. INTL L. & TRADE 1, 2
(1996).
16 ALBERT H.Y. CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA 6 (3d. ed. 2004).17 See Alsen, supra note 15, at 8.
"8 See id. at 18.
19 See Mark T. Kremzner, Managing Urban Land in China: The Emerging Legal Framework and its
Role in Development, 7 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 611, 622 (1998).
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 622-623 (citing Qi Mingshen, Dui Chengshi Tudi Shangpin De Zhiyi [Doubts Concerning
Urban Land as a Commodity], 61 JIANGHAN LUNTAN [JIANGHAN TRIBUNE] 4 (1985)).
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itself and ensured that land ownership technically remained with the
people-thus keeping true to the tenets of Marxist ideology.
One Vietnamese legal scholar has noted that land use rights in this
way "rescue[d] millions of Chinese and Vietnamese from hunger," while
"enabl[ing] private property right[s] [in] land, without political and social
unrest as it may follow in implementing the privatization program
advised.., in Russia."23  Chinese arguments against establishment of a
more delineated property regime have similarly rested on the failed
24experiences of the post-Soviet economies. In countries such as China and
Vietnam, "where the doctrine [of] 'ownership of the whole people' cannot
disappear easily,, 25 scholars maintain that the contracting out of private
property rights "may be one of the most efficient ways to diversify
ownership in [the] means of production"26 -in a way that allows for
smoother transition from planned to market economy than was seen in the
former Soviet states.
2. What Lies Beneath: Property Protection under Chinese Law
When the Party, led by Deng Xiaoping, adopted the 1982 Constitution
in order to lay a framework for modernization, it chose to explicitly
emphasize the goals of production and economic development.27 The 1982
Constitution has thus been labeled a "programmatic Constitution," because it
defines a mission for the State and its citizens through which China may be
transformed into a strong and prosperous, culturally advanced, democratic
28socialist nation. The development of each city is expected to conform to
a long-term comprehensive physical plan 29 that comports with the
23 See Nghia D. Pham, The Long March Toward Private Property Right in Vietnam: A Legal,
Cultural and Political Approach 10 (2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Pacific Rim Law & Policy
Journal).
24 CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA, ROUNDTABLE ON PROPERTY SEIZURES IN
CHINA: POLITICS, LAW, AND PROTEST (June 21, 2004) (statement of Professor Jacque deLisle, University of
Pennsylvania Law School) [hereinafter deLisle].
23 See Pham, supra note 23, at 23.
26 id.
27 See Alsen, supra note 15, at 5. See also OULINES OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA 6-7 (Zhang Fusen & Hu Zejun eds., 2004) (noting that the 1982 Constitution was
designed "[t]o adapt to the tremendous changes of the country in its political, economic, social and cultural
life brought about by the reform and opening-up policy"); CHEN, supra note 16, at 36 (citing to the focus at
the National Conference on Political-Legal Work in July 1982 on contributing to economic development
and socialist modernization).
28 See Alsen, supra note 15, at 4.
29 Municipal governments are required to formulate two types of urban plans that "scientifically
forecast local needs." See Kremzner, supra note 19, at 644. The first is the "comprehensive city plan"
(chengshi zongti guihua), typically set for ten to twenty years and addressing zoning, land use layout,
VOL. 14 No. 3
THE URBAN RENEWAL PROCESS IN CHINA
production and economic development aims established by the central
government.
30
True modernization, however, posits that free markets are necessary to
optimize efficiency in resource allocation, while governments tend only to
interfere with this process.3' China's challenge has been to reconcile this
commonly held vision of "modernization" with its own belief that
developing states need to "intervene more strenuously in order to ensure
rapid industrialization and catch up with the advanced economies." 32  State
intervention remains pervasive in China, particularly given the successful
models established by Singapore and Hong Kong (in which land use was
closely controlled to guide urban growth), as well as Taiwan (in which the
government has actively requisitioned and encouraged transformation of
land from agricultural to industrial purposes).33
The notion of property rights thus exists in Chapter 1 of the Chinese
Constitution, 34 but only as a part of the nation's general governing
principles. 35  In that chapter, it remains clear that the State may "in the
public interest" (weile gonggong liyi) take over land for use in accordance
with law.36  This provision was amended only last year to incorporate
language echoing the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and provide
for compensation in the event of a taking.37 However, Article 51 of
Chapter 2 imposes the obligation not to infringe upon the interests of the
State, society or collective, or the rights of other citizens, in the exercise of
construction standards, transportation systems and green space. Id. The second is a "detailed city plan"
(chengshi xiangxi guihua), re-established every several years and addressing building heights, density
limits, construction standards and the other particulars of development projects. Id. The comprehensive
city plan must be coordinated with several other land management plans approved by higher-level
authorities, including the national land plan (guotu guihua), regional plan (quyu), waterway and lowland
plan (jianghe liuyu guihua) and the comprehensive land utilization plan (tudi liyong zongti guihua, also
discussed infra Part III). See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Chengshi Guihuafa [PRC Urban Planning
Law] (promulgated Dec. 26, 1989, effective Apr. 1, 1990), art. 7, available at http://www.law11O.com/law/
country/l007.htm (last visited June 8, 2005). Once these high-level authorities have approved the
comprehensive city plan, and the municipal people's government has approved the detailed city plan, all
land within the municipality must be used accordingly. See Kremzner, supra note 19, at 644.
30 The central government's current urbanization policy, for example, seeks to minimize the growth
of large urban areas and facilitate "appropriate development" of medium and small cities. See Kremzner,
supra note 19, at 645. Individual city plans have thus shifted accordingly.
31 See Kremzner, supra note 19, at 613.
32 Id. at 617.
33 id.
34 See XtANFA, art. 10-13.
35 The concept of property rights is notably absent from Chapter 2, which lays out fundamental rights
and duties. Id.
36 See id. art. 10.
37 Even after the recent amendments, the Constitution still falls to set a standard or any guidance on
the amount of such compensation. For a more detailed analysis of the 2004 amendments and underlying
issues, ee infra Part Ill.
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individual rights. Read against Article 53, which calls for the protection of
State property, this provision seems to uphold the dominance of State and
collective interests over individual interests in the area of property
ownership.
Indeed, the basis of the PRC economic system remains socialist public
ownership of the means of production, which may take shape in either
"ownership by the whole people" (quanmin suoyouzhi) or "laboring masses'
collective ownership" (laodong qunzhong jiti suoyouzhi).38  The State-
operated economy, which corresponds to the system of ownership by the
whole people, is dominant in the urban areas of the country, while the
"socialist laboring masses' collective ownership economy" is dominant in
the rural areas. 39  With respect to land, private property rights exist only to
the extent that the State or collective has granted or allocated land to private
actors for use.
In China's rural areas, land owned by the peasant collectives may be
allocated to individual households for both farming and residential
purposes. 40  Rural resident rights, however, are derivative and recognized
merely as "contracting to operate" rights (chengbao jingying quan), limited
41to a term of thirty years. Individual households may register certification
42of such rights with the Ministry of Agriculture, but cannot register
ownership of their houses or other buildings on the land.43
In China's urban areas, land apportionment is administered generally
through the State Land Administration Bureau ("SLAB"), the government
entity responsible for formulating national policies and regulations with
respect to land conservation, development and use. The State may allocate
38 See CHEN, supra note 16, at 57 (citing to Article 6 of the Chinese Constitution).
39 See id. (citing to Articles 7 and 8 of the Chinese Constitution).
40 See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Nongcun Tudi Chengbaofa [PRC Rural Land Contracting Law]
(adopted Aug. 29, 2002 by Standing Committee of the NPC, effective Mar. 1, 2003), available at
http://www.lawilO.comllaw/country/l0l2.htm (last visited June 8, 2005). Article 5 states that "members
of rural collective economic entities have the right to contract rural land that is allocated through
contracting by their own rural collective economic entity."
41 See id. art. 20.
42 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Nongcun Tudi Chengbao Jingyingquan Zheng Guanli Banfa [PRC
Measures for the Administration of the Certificates of the Right to Contracted Management of Rural Land]
(issued by the Ministry of Agriculture on Dec. 1, 2003, effective Jan. 1, 2004), available at
http://www.law Il0.conilaw/nonglin/23902l .htm (last visited June 8, 2005).
43 Registration of the certificates evidencing an individual's rights in the land is required to create a
property interest. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Tudi Guanlifa [PRC Land Management Law] (adopted
on June 25, 1986 by the NPC) art. 13, translated at http://english.sohu.comI2004/07/04/80/article220848
071.shtmi (last visited June 8, 2005) [hereinafter Land Management Law]; Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo
Tudi Guanlifa Shishi Tiaoli [PRC Implementing Regulations] (issued by the State Council on Dec. 24, 1998,
effective Jan. 1, 1999, superceding Jan. 4, 1991, version) art. 3, available at http://www.law110.com/law/
guowuyuan/2011 .htm (last visited June 8, 2005) [hereinafter Management Regulations].
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without consideration (huabo) the equivalent of "land use rights" (tudi
shiyongqyuan),44 which carry no time limits on them, but can be revoked by
the State as necessary or required.45  Since 1949, real property in urban
areas has been predominantly managed by State-owned enterprises ("SOEs"),
or "work units" (danwei),46 to which the government allocated land free of
charge in accordance with economic plans drawn by the Economic Planning
Commission.n7
Urban land use rights may alternatively be granted as a type of
leasehold for compensation (youchang churang).8  The land-use fee is
determined through auction, tender, or agreement and then paid to SLAB in
exchange for a land-use certificate (tudi shiyongzheng). 49  The State
promises not to recover land-use rights from the land user before the
expiration of a seventy-year term, but may expropriate the land "under
special circumstances and in light of social and public interests.,,5 0 After
this seventy-year term expires, the land, including all buildings on it,
automatically reverts to the State without need for compensation. 51
B. Economic Reform and Decentralization of Land Management
1. Setting the Stage for a Land Grab
By the mid-1980s, a number of factors,52 including the rise of the real
estate market and an increased focus among Party leaders on foreign
investment, pushed the central government to effectively sanction and codify
land use rights through a series of liberalizing reforms. The National
People's Congress ("NPC")53 amended the Constitution in 1988 to read:
44 Land Management Law, supra note 43, art. 54.
45 See Alsen, supra note 15, at 20.
4l d. at 18, 20.
47 See Kremzner, supra note 19, at 619.
48 Land Management Law, supra note 43, art. 54.
49 See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Chengzhen Guoyou Tudi Shiyongquan Churang he Zhuanrang
Zanxing Tiaoli [PRC Provisional Regulations Concerning the Grant and Assignment of the Assignment and
Transfer of the Right to Use State-Owned Land in Urban Areas] (issued on May 19, 1990 by the State
Council) art. 16, available at http://www.law110.com/law/guowuyuan/2015.htm (last visited June 8, 2005).
so Id. art. 42 (providing for compensation on the basis of the number of years left in the contract and
the extent to which the land has been developed).
31 See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Chengshi Fangdichan Guanlifa [PRC Urban Real Estate
Management Law] (adopted by the NPC Jan. 1, 1995) art. 21, available at http://www.law 1O.com/law/
countr/1011.htm (last visited June 8, 2005).
s For a more detailed discussion, see Kremzner, supra note 19, at 622-25.
53 Under the Chinese Constitution, the National People's Congress is the highest organ of State
power, responsible for exercising the legislative power of the State. XIANFA, supra note 14, art. 58.
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"the right to use land may be transferred according to law." 54  Soon
thereafter, it revised Article 2 of the Land Management Law ("LML") to
read: "the right to use State owned or collectively owned land may be
assigned pursuant to the law.",
55
Even before these formal amendments were made, the first transfers
of land use rights had already taken place in 1987, in the Shenzhen Special
Economic Zone.56 Realizing the success of the Shenzhen model, the
central government created additional legislation providing for the
cultivation of economic and technological development zones ("ETDZs"),
which could enjoy greater flexibility on the duration of grant terms,
streamlined procedures and conditions for assignment of property interests
and, in some cases, reduced grant fees.57 By 1993, ETDZs had proliferated
throughout China, particularly in the coastal provinces. 58  County and
municipal governments were so eager to draw foreign investors that some
even set up ETDZs without proper authorization.5 9
The stage was thus set for a land grab that continues today. As the
public sector increasingly lost control over resource allocation and found it
necessary to turn to non-public sectors in order to secure economic
development, 60 China in effect "modernized," with land management
becoming increasingly decentralized. Beginning in the 1980s, the central
government reduced its investment in local projects, leaving local
governments responsible for-and in control of-both development funds
and land use decisions. 6 1 Local governments scrambled to develop morediversified investment mechanisms to fund their projects, relying on a
14 Id. art. 10.
55 See Land Management Law, supra note 43, ch. 1, art. 2.56 See Alsen, supra note 15, at 19.
57 See Kremzner, supra note 19, at 638.
58 id.
59 Id. The Ministry of Land and Resources ("MLR") quashed over 2600 illegal economic
development zones in 2003 alone. See Jia Hepeng, Nation's Land Management System under Reform,
CHINA BusiNEss WEEKLY, Jan. 6, 2004, available at http://www.chinadaily.com/cn/en/doc/2004-
01/06/content_297063.htm (last visited June 8, 2005).
60 One Chinese legal scholar notes that the non-public sector accounted for only 9.4% of industrial
output in 1960, but this number rose to 21.5% in 1979 and 71.8% in 1998. See Cao Siyuan, Siyou
Caichan Baohu Yu Minying Qiye Chengzhang-Xuexi Xianfa Xiuzhengan de Sidian Tihui [Private Property
Protection and Development of the Non-Public Sector: Four Lessons from the Experience of Constitutional
Amendment], sec. 1, para. 3, available at http://www.caosy.com/siyuani/view.asp?id=124 (last visited June 8,
2005). Another points to the fact that at least forty percent of the nation's economic activities are now in
the hands of non-public sectors. See Zhang, Urban Development, supra note 5, at 479 (citing 1999 figures
from the China Statistics Bureau).
61 See Tingwei Zhang, Decentralization, Localization, and the Emergence of Quasi-Participatory
Decision-Making Structure in Urban Development in Shanghai, 7 INT'L PLANNING STUDIES 303, 305 (2002)
[hereinafter Zhang, Decentralization].
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combination of local loans, municipal bonds and foreign investment.62  At
the same time, local agencies such as planning and land bureaus (guihua tudi
fianshe guanliju) found themselves able to wield newfound power over land
use, utilizing it as a commodity to leverage land supply and demand based
on market principles.63
Decentralization in China has ultimately turned out quite chaotic, as
both local government and interest groups, including SOEs and commercial
developers, compete to make a profit from development projects. The
economics and politics of decentralization have created an incentive scheme
that compels urban growth and development of land, regardless of actual
need. 64  Recent statistics show that as of September 2004, a total of
97,480,000 square meters of property lay idle in China, 57,360,000 of which
is residential property.65  However, as much as twenty-five to fifty percent
of local revenues in some cities continue to be derived from land-generated
income.
6 6
Cities and individual districts within cities engage in "fierce
competition" over domestic and foreign investment. 67  One scholar of
urban planning has commented: "As a city expands, so too does the political
power base of municipal Party secretaries and city mayors." 68  This scholar
notes that since 1992, two former deputy mayors of Shanghai have been
62 Id. See also Howard W. French, New Boomtowns Change Path of China's Growth, N.Y. TIMES,
July 28, 2004, available at LEXIS, News Library, ALLNWS File.
63 See Zhang, Decentralization, supra note 61, at 307. With the shift in focus on housing as a
"welfare good" of the mid-I 980s to a booming market in which State-owned work units, such as ministries
and agencies, were given the authority to control their own revenue and budget, the aims of these agencies
shifted. Able to afford market prices, work units at first purchased real estate in order to distribute
housing to their own employees at subsidized prices. See Zhang & Fang, supra note 9, at 290. "Lured
by higher returns," many subsequently invested their funds in real estate development projects that would
turn a6profit. See Zhang, Decentralization, supra note 61, at 309.
Id. at 307. In an effort to re-centralize control over land management to counter local land abuses,
the MLR recently announced that it is embarking on the largest national land survey in Chinese history, in
order to assess land resources and arable land loss. See Fan Lixiang, Guotu Ziyuan Bu Cha Jiadi,
Zhongyang Difang Fendan Diaocha Zijin [MLR Launches National Land Survey, Central and Local
Governments Share Responsibility for Surveying Funds], 21ST CENTURY BusINESS HERALD, Feb. 28, 2005,
available at http://www.nanfangdaily.com.cnijj/20050228/zj1200502280123.asp (last visited June 8, 2005).
65 See Fangwu Xianzhi Ying Zheng Budongchan Shui [Immoveable Property Tax Should Be Levied
on Idle Housing Properties], THE BEuING NEWS, Mar. 7, 2005, available at http://www.thebeijingnews.com
/news/2005/0307/05@0255332.htmi (last visited June 8, 2005).
66 See Zhang & Fang, supra note 9, at 290.
67 See Kremzner, supra note 19, at 649-650. After decentralization, district governments can now
collect revenue from district-owned enterprises and share tax revenues with the municipal government.
See Zhang, Decentralization, supra note 61, at 310. To compete, district governments have taken
advantage of the authority that they now share with municipal planning bureaus on matters of land use,
design review and other planning controls, to make their own districts more attractive to business
investment. Id. at 311. For more on the role that district governments play in the eviction and
demolition process, see infra Part ll.B.2.
68 See Zhang, Urban Development, supra note 5, at 487.
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promoted to national ranks-in large part as a result of the economic success
of their city. Local officials, judged by economic measures, such as how
many jobs they create or how many buildings they develop, are thus "trying
the same formula: manufacturing and export zones, research parks and self-
styled Silicon Valleys." 69  Such development is seen as the quick road to
growth of both the city and its leaders' political influence. With land-use
grants involving such large sums of money and influence-and administered
by such poorly paid civil servants-the specter of a land grab has thus
70loomed large in cities throughout China.
2. The Administrative Maze of Competing Interests
The social cost of the urban land grab that is occurring throughout
China has been widespread displacement of resident communities in both
cities and immediately-adjacent rural areas. Beijing has acknowledged that
since 1991, 400,000 households have been relocated.7' Officials expect to
relocate another 6000 in anticipation of the construction of Olympics venues
designed to hold the 2008 games.72 Shanghai similarly reported more than
1.5 million displaced residents between 1991 and 1997-a figure amounting
in recent years to one out of every six city dwellers.73 An additional
760,000 residents are expected to be moved from the city's outer ring road
by 2010, when Shanghai is scheduled to hold the World Expo.74
In the ancient capital of Xi'an, a total of 170,000 residents living in
the areas surrounded by the historical city wall will be moved out by 2020,
to advance the Municipal Urban Planning Bureau's ambitious new plan for
better protection of the city's ancient heritage.75 This number represents
forty percent of the existing 420,000 population living within the
enclosure.76 Despite the insistence by local planning officials that
69 See French, supra note 62.
70 See Alsen, supra note 15, at 19.
71 See Beijing Denies Reports on Large-Scale Evictions, CHINA DAILY, Mar. 11, 2004,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-03/11/content_313640.htm (last visited June 8, 2005).
While Miao Leru, director of the Beijing Municipal Administration of State Land, Resources and Housing,
insisted at a press conference that the relocated households have benefited from increased housing area
after resettlement by the government, statistics continue to show that four out of every 1000 cases of
demolition is forced. Id.
72 id.
73 See Zhang, Urban Development, supra note 5, at 488 (citing 1997 statistics from the Shanghai
Social Science Institute).
74 See Eva Woo, Shanghai to Move 760,000 Residents from Inner-City Area, SOUTH CHINA MORNING
POST, Nov. 18, 2004, available at LEXIS, Nexis Library, ALLNWS File.
75 See Ma Lie, Xi'an Plans to Better Protect Ancient Walled Center, CHINA DAILY, Nov. 3, 2004,
http://www.chinadaly.com.cn/english/doc/2004-11/03/content_388092.htm (last visited June 8, 2005).
76 Id.
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residents' living conditions will be greatly improved and that Xi'an will
become "an international modem metropolis featuring both ancient culture
and modem civilization," 77 residents have accused the government of
forcing them off the land solely to profit from the sale of the land to
developers.78
The pairing of local government with business interest groups such as
real estate developers creates "pro-growth coalitions, 79 which in fact pose a
significant threat to resident rights. Developers unwilling to negotiate and
deal with local residents' collectives8 ° are able to manipulate the mechanism
of land administration and rely on government clout to achieve their aims.
The mechanism of land management in China fails residents mainly because
it is convoluted, lacks transparency, and involves a dozen different,
competing State agencies, all motivated to prioritize only their own short-
term gains.
The municipal governments and SOEs that drive development
decisions, for example, often possess profit-making interests aligned with
the non-public sector, rather than the local communities they serve.81  The
district governments responsible for land preparation for leasing are even
more ambivalent in their allegiances. While district officials must report to
the district People's Congress, 82 Congressional representatives are elected
7 See China to Evict 170,000 Residents from Ancient City of Xian, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE
(Beijing), Nov. 3, 2004, available at LEXIS, Nexis Library, ALLNWS File..
78 Id.
79 This term has its origins in the study of urban planning and urban regime theory. Developed
during the 1970s and early 1980s, this theory presumes that the division between State and marketplace in
liberal democratic societies will tend to result in the government's lack of authority and resources to govern,
which in turn creates an incentive for informal arrangements to be made between the public and non-public
sectors. See Zhang, Urban Development, supra note 5, at 475-76. As a byproduct of such a coalition,
the State continues to exercise direct power over others on political issues, but loses its power on economic
issues. Id. at 477.
80 In rural areas, peasant collectives do have the opportunity to interface with the State on behalf of
individuals and households, in the event of a requisition. This is done through the mechanism of a village
committee. See Peter Ho, Who Owns China's Land? Policies, Property Rights, and Deliberate
Institutional Ambiguity, 177 CHINAQ. 394, 397-401 (2001). This Article focuses mainly on mechanisms
and issues encountered during the urban renewal process and therefore discusses in infra Part II.B the
situation encountered by rural residents only to the extent that they live in suburban areas immediately
impacted by urban development. For more detailed discussions of rural takings and farmers' land rights
generally, including the history and changing nature of such rights, see Brian Schwarzwalder et al., An
Update on China's Rural Land Tenure System Reforms: Analysis and Recommendations Based on a
Seventeen-Province Survey, 16 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1, 141-225 (2003); Kari Madrene Larson, Comment, A
Lesson in Ingenuity: Chinese Farmers, the State, and the Reclamation of Farmland for Most Any Use, 7
PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 831 (1998).
s See Zhang, Urban Development, supra note 5, at 485.
82 The Party is set up in every work unit at the local level, through municipal and provincial party
congresses. See THOMAS CHIU ET AL., LEGAL SYSTEMS OF THE PRC 43 (1991). The National Party
Congress presides over lower units.
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by district residents only in theory and are in reality nominated by municipal
governments. 83  Moreover, in recent years district governments have
developed their own, unique interests, joining pro-growth coalitions and
partnering with commercial developers in a number of profit-making
business ventures.
84
Local street committees (jiedao banshichu) do not exist to protect the
interests of residents, either. They must report to, and technically operate
under, the supervision of the Committee of Resident Representatives
("CRR" or jumin daibiao dahui), a body comprised of ordinary citizens.85
However, the street committee actually functions as the local representative
of the district government, its tasks defined by both the municipal and
district leadership.86  Although street committees are not directly involved
in the real estate business, they may form partnerships with various
development companies, taking on responsibility for securing land
acquisition and displacing residents.87 In addition, the revenue from local
businesses is used to pay bonuses to street committee staff and may
sometimes exceed the salary they receive from the district government,
influencing their incentives in ways antagonistic to local residents.88
The only party that may be said to work in the interest of residents is
the residents committee ("RC!," jumin weiyuanhui or juweihui), officially
regarded as a residents' organization. 89  In practice, however, the RC also
functions as an extended administrative body at the lowest level 9° and acts
as an agent for the developer during the planning and relocation process. 91
83 See Zhang, Decentralization, supra note 61, at 311.
84 Local official involvement varies from investing in the development projects to running the
companies performing demolition or profiting from the fees associated with the process of eviction and
demolition. See CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA, ROUNDTABLE ON PROPERTY
SEIZURES IN CHINA: POLITICS, LAW, AND PROTEST, supra note 24 (statement of Sara M. Davis, Researcher,
Asia Division, Human Rights Watch). Such involvement is often conducted under the guise of a different
name, since the central government bans administrative bodies from engaging in business transactions.
See Zhang, Urban Development, supra note 5, at 486. One Chinese urban development scholar notes that
development agencies in fact owe their origins to various construction agency branches of the municipal or
district government, such as the Property Management Bureau (fangguan ju) or Urban Construction
Commission (chengshi fianshe weiyuanhui, or fian wei). Daniel Abramson, "Marketization" and
Institutions in Chinese Inner-City Neighborhood Redevelopment: A Commentary on "Beijing's Old and
Dilapidated Housing Renewal" by Lii Junhua," 14 CITIES 71, 73 (1997).
8 See Zhang, Decentralization, supra note 61, at 317.
86 Id. at 312. While district governments focus on economic development, street committees tend
to manage services for the community. Id. at 312-13.
8' Id. at 316. For this reason, both the street committee and the city planning and land
administration bureau were named as defendants in the case cited in Part I.
8 Id. at 315.
89 Id. at 309.
90 Id.
91 See Abramson, supra note 84, at 73.
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Neither the RC nor the CRR, to which street committees must report, truly
enjoys any significant influence over the process. As a result, the
mechanism for land management in China is heavily biased toward the
government and, through pro-growth coalitions, the business elite.
One positive development has been the rise in recent years in the
popularity and number of homeowners' associations (yezhu weiyuanhui; also
known as "property owners associations. 92  But while seen by some as one
trend toward a more participatory decision-making structure, 93 the reality is
that coalition building by residents remains weak and ineffective. While
discussions on the status and scope of property owners associations have
made their way into deliberations on the draft Property Law to be finalized
in June 2005, Chinese law currently fails to recognize the authority of such
entities.94 Residents thus continue to lack effective means with which to
counter the political clout of the pro-growth coalitions, and as a result,
governments and businesses leverage power imbalances to their interest,
consistently at the cost of the local communities.95
III. RESPONSES TO A FLAWED INFRASTRUCTURE MERELY HELP PATCH THE
FACADE
The new social contract that has been formed as a result of
marketization and decentralization has created a gap between pro-growth
coalitions and local communities, with respect to the access to benefits
enjoyed by each. In recent years, social unrest has been fueled by this very
division between those seen as participants and those who are merely
outsiders to China's new social contract.96  Reforms have been aimed at
easing the unrest created by rapid urbanization, particularly through
92 Such associations are more common in cities where housing reform has led to increased home
ownership. Studies have thus tended to focus on property owners association activities in Shanghai,
where the home ownership rate has reached sixty-three percent. See Zhang, Decentralization, supra note
61, at 317. There, property owner associations have taken on significant responsibilities to ensure the
smooth operation of urban development projects in local neighborhoods, challenging and competing with
equivalent government functionaries. Id. at 318-319. In a survey of 1500 residential communities in
Beijing, 45.5% were found to possess property owner associations. See Wuquan Fa Liu Yue Zai Ci Shenyi
[Deliberations on Property Law Continue in June], THE BEllING NEWS, Mar. 2, 2005, available at
http://www.thebeijingnews.com/news/2005/0302/05@005 8 16 .html (last visited June 8, 2005) [hereinafter
Property Law].
93 See Zhang, Decentralization, supra note 61, at 319. One Beijing resident comments: "A lack of
homeowners associations means that homeowners lose their power to participate in the administration of
the residential community." See Property Law, supra note 92.
94 See Property Law, supra note 92.
95 See generally Zhang, Urban Development, supra note 5.
96 See ROBERTO M. UNGER, DEMOCRACY REALIZED: THE PROGRESSIVE ALTERNATIVE 108 (1998).
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increased protection of farmers' interests. 97  The following section outlines
the substantial inequalities that continue to exist and are hidden beneath new
and enhanced legal provision for formal equality.
A. Resort to Punitive Measures in Hunan Province
Chinese legal scholars note that in 2003, with China's average per
person GDP exceeding U.S. $1000 for the first time, the country entered into
a period of rapid urbanization in which cities needed to expand and land
became "the main source of local government's finances." 98  Despite
central government efforts to strengthen marketization, 99 local authorities
have continued to assign redevelopment projects exclusively to local SOEs,
in exchange for delivery of social services. 1°° SOEs thus exercise a land
monopoly that allows them to turn land over to other developers for a profit,
without engaging in any genuine development.'01
Capitalizing on the lack of accountability at the local level, developers
"overturn zoning and building codes with skillful arguments and, quite often
bribes, turning inner-city redevelopment into a process of 'speculation,
private deals and corruption."",10 2  This corruption is evidenced by figures
produced by the government itself, as well as a number of high-profile cases
reported in both the domestic and international media. In Guangzhou, for
example, the municipal government reported a 1993 land leasing revenue
figure that, based on market price, was merely one-sixth of what should have
been collected. 10 3  At the NPC convened in March 2004,'04 delegate Hu
Yamei presented a document entitled "Special Revelation," reporting that
97 See New Policy, supra note 6, para. 5.98 See Zhao Ling, Significant Shift in Focus of Peasants' Rights Activism-An Interview with Rural
Development Research Yu Jianrong of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, NANFANG ZHOUMO
[SOUTHERN WEEKEND), Sept. 3, 2004, at Pt. II, available at http://www.chinaelections.org/en/readnews.asp?
newsid={AOB4FFF9-1F57-460D-BBB3-824B59420C2F}&classid=17&classname=Villages (last visited
June 8, 2005).
99 The MLR declared in December 2003 that personnel in local land management departments would
be directly controlled by provincial governments instead of local governments. See Jia, supra note 59.
The purpose was to prevent local officials from interfering. with the ratification of land transactions and
place control into the hands of more objective provincial governments, unable to participate in land
transactions. Id.
1oo See Zhang & Fang, supra note 9, at 291.
101 Id.
102 Id.
:03 See Zhang, Decentralization, supra note 61, at 308.
(54 The NPC convenes for a plenary session only once each year. See TAO-TA HStA & CONSTANCE
AXINN JOHNSON, LAW MAKING IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: TERMS, PROCEDURES, HIERARCHY,
AND INTERPRETATION 1, 4 (1986).
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138.72 billion renminbi (roughly U.S. $16.64 billion) 10 5 in public money
had disappeared into the private coffers of developers and corrupt officials
between 1990 and 1998.
One particularly notable case from 2004 involved the illegal eviction
of local residents in Jiahe County, located in the central inland province of
Hunan. In late April 2004, Li Huiming was one of many Jiahe residents
whose home was forcibly dismantled. 1°' When a houseguest insisted that
the police arriving to assist in the eviction should instead help to protect
private property, Li, the houseguest and another resident were all detained
and accused of "violence to resist law enforcement" and "interfering in
public affairs.' 0 7  Released one month later, the men eventually took their
case to a team of Tsinghua University lawyers in Beijing.'
0 8
The Jiahe case raised a number of pressing issues, including: (1)
whether the county had misused its administrative power in violation of the
Constitution; (2) whether compensation for eviction was too low; and (3)
whether a deal struck between local government and developer to build the
Zhuquan Department Store had actually motivated the evictions and could
justifiably be seen as "a project that will serve local people and the long-
term development of the county. ''1°9 After receiving growing complaints
from locals, the Ministry of Construction sent an investigation team to Jiahe
County to work jointly with the Hunan provincial government in
investigating the matter.
State-owned news agencies, including China Central Television and
Xinhua, later reported that the local government had "illegally supported the
evictions,""' removing and resettling to distant suburbs a total of eleven
households. The investigation found that local officials had issued
authorizing documentation, including land-use and other certificates, despite
the absence of this new project in official city plans and the failure of the
developer to pay relevant land use fees.' 2  The price at which developers
105 See Zhang & Fang, supra note 9, at 296-297 n.37. U.S. $1 is equivalent to 8.3 renminbi. The
quoted figure includes 58.67 billion renminbi that should have been paid in compensation for relocation,
36.60 billion for demolition and 43.45 billion as the difference between market price and what developers
actually paid. Id.
'o See Fu Jing, Gov't Pays Residents for Wrongful Arrest, CHINA DAILY, June 3, 2004, available at
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-06/03/content_335955.htm (last visited June 8, 2005).
107 Id.
1o8 Id.
1o9 Id.
11o id.
I1 Id.
112 See Hunan Sheng, Jianshebu Yansu Chachu Jiahe Weifa Qiangzhi Chaiqian Anjian [Solemn
Investigation by Hunan Province and Ministry of Construction Reveals Jiahe Case of Illegally Forced
Eviction and Demolition], XINHUA NET (Beijing), June 4, 2004, available at http://news.sohu.com/2004/06/
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purchased the land was reported to be a mere 1.3% of its actual market
value. 
113
In the wake of the Jiahe case, Jiahe County Party Committee
Secretary Zhou Yuwa and County Magistrate Li Shidong were removed
from their posts, while several other leading county officials were seriously
reprimanded. 114 Upon appeal of his administrative suit against the
government, Li Huiming was awarded 665,888 renminbi, 600,000 of which
was designed to compensate him for emotional harm suffered' 15-in effect
treating the local government as tortfeasor. Several months later, the
Supreme People's Procuratorate"16 announced a new campaign to curtail
human rights abuses, particularly in four focal categories that included land
requisition (zhengyong) 1 7 and forced eviction (qiangzhi chaiqian).18  In a
sign that concern over land abuses had reached even the upper echelons of
the Party, on October 13, 2004, Premier Wen Jiabao chaired a meeting of the
State Council," 9 through which the Council came to a decision "so as to
further reform and tighten the management of land.' 2 °
A number of measures were subsequently issued to deal with the
problems of corruption and land speculation made apparent by the Jiahe
case. Article 24 of an October 21 State Council decision (the "October
Decision"), 121 for example, calls on local governments to not only levy fines
04/40/news220394073.shtmJ (last visited June 8, 2005) [hereinafter Jiahe Investigation].
:13 See Fu, supra note 106.
114 See Jiahe Investigation, supra note 112.
115 See Jiahe Shijian Ki Chaiqian Huzhuang Gao Xian Fangchan Guanli Ju An Kaiting Shenpan
[Trial Commences on the Case of a Victim of Demolition and Relocation Against the County Property
Management Bureau], XINHUA NET (Changsha), Sept. 7, 2004, available at http://news.sohu.com
20040907/n221927092.shtm (last visited June 8, 2005).
116 Article 130 of the Chinese Constitution provides that the central government will establish a
Supreme People's Procuratorate and local people's procuratorates at each at each level of the governmental
structure. XIANFA, art. 130. The people's procuratorates are state organs for legal supervision,
simultaneously acting as prosecutor in all criminal cases, while supervising the courts to make sure that
they have adhered to the correct procedure.
117 All uses of the term "requisition" refer to seizure of farmland, as opposed to urban land for
eviction and demolition purposes.
ll8 See Li Pengxiang & Yang Weihan, Si Lei Duzhi Qinquan Anjian Jiangbei Zhongdian Miaozhun[Four Categories of Cases in Breach and Violation of Rights Become Focal Point], XINHUA NEWS AGENCY,
Sept. 29, 2004, available at http:llwww.gmw.cn/content/2004-09/29/content_109050.htm (last visited June
8, 2005).
l"9 Article 85 of the Chinese Constitution provides that the State Council shall serve as the executive
body of the NPC. XIANFA, art. 85. In addition to being the highest executive organ of State power and
the highest organ of State administration, it has been noted that it is the constitutional organ most closely
affiliated with the Party. See Marc Rosenberg, The Chinese Legal System Made Easy: A Survey of the
Structure of Government, Creation of Legislation, and the Judicial System Under the Constitution and
Major Statutes of the People's Republic of China, 9 U. MIAMI INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 225, 233 (2000).
12 See Gov't ightens Arable Land Management, XINHA NET (Beijing), Oct. 13, 2004. available at
http://news.xinhuanet.comenglish/2004-10/13/content_206924.htm (last visited June 8, 2005).
121 The State Council has relatively broad legislative powers, including adoption of administrative
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for illegal buildings and structures, but also requisition and demolish them
(for compensation) and recover the land-acquisition fees required by law.
122
However, the language in Article 24 leaves crucial matters open to
interpretation, including when a development project may be found to
contravene a city plan or violate land law and regulations.
The circular jointly issued in December 2004 (the "December
Circular") by the Finance Ministry, Ministry of Land and Resources ("MLR")
and People's Bank reflects solutions that are a bit less harsh, but deal more
directly with the wrongdoings of government officials like those in Jiahe.
123
With respect to land approved between 2003 and April 2004 for new
construction, if requisite land-use fees have not been paid, the next senior
level of government is to set a timeline for rectification and payment in
arrears, during which period land management bureaus may not requisition
and transform from agricultural to industrial purposes any additional land.
124
Land management and finance departments are also to establish a system by
which land-use fees must be paid first, before land is distributed, and then
directly deposited into the State treasury before being allocated on a thirty to
seventy percent basis to the central government and the locality,
respectively. 125 Additionally, with respect to new projects, land
management bureaus are not to issue authorizing documents until land use
fees are in fact paid.
126
These legal provisions do not effectively deal with transactions and
monies swapped two, three, or several years ago, however. It remains to be
seen how they will affect land deals in the future, but their overall effect may
be to re-centralize a previously decentralized property rights regime and
chill potential investment. Furthermore, by focusing on the issue of
whether fees have been paid, they leave aside the more important issues of
measures (xingzheng cuoshi, or banfa), enactment of administrative rules and regulations (xingzheng fagui,
or tiaoli) and issuance of decisions (jueding) and orders (mingling) in accordance with the Constitution and
statutes. XIANFA, art. 89(1). It is empowered to draw up plans for economic and social development,
and to organize, coordinate and administer social production and economic development. Id. art. 89(5).
122 Guowuyuan Guanyu Shenhua Gaige Yange Tudi Guanli de Jueding [State Council Decision
Concerning In-Depth Reform and Tightening Up of Land Management] (issued Oct. 21, 2004) art. 24,
available at http://www.lawllO.comlaw/guowuyuan/2159.htm (last visited June 8, 2005) [hereinafter
October Decision].
123 See generally Caizhengbu, Guotu Ziyuanbu, Zhongguo Renmin Yinhang Guanyu Jinyibu Jiaqiang
Xinzeng Jianshe Yongdi Tudi Youchang Shiyongfei Zhengshou Shiyong Guanli de Tongzhi [Finance
Ministry, Ministry of Land and Resources and People's Bank Circular on Strengthening Management of the
Collection and Use of Land Use Fees Owed on Land Used for New Construction] (issued Dec. 6, 2004,
effective Jan. 1, 2005), available at http://www.mlr.gov.cn/pub/gtzyblzwgklggtglt2004l206_52367.htm
(last visited June 8, 2005).
'2A Id. art. 2.
... Id. art. 3(1)-(2).
126 Id. art. 3(2).
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how much, and to whom, and thus do not effectively alter the incentives of
the local bureaucrats benefiting from such deals.
The real, underlying issues, unresolved by these reform measures, are
hinted at in a recent editorial report from the province-wide conference held
on June 22, 2004, in Changsha, to debrief the matter. Provincial leaders
severely criticized the Jiahe municipal government and local developer for
substituting market forces with administrative discretion and legal process
with their own official directive. 127  Since then, the city of Shanghai has
gone further, to announce that anyone found forcibly removing residents to
make way for infrastructure of commercial construction projects (as was the
case in Jiahe) could face criminal penalties in the future. 128
What would be more effective than imposing additional regulations on
developers, or punishing one level of government and then shifting control
to another, is a reformed process in which government officials are
incentivized to administer rights in land in accordance with law, in the
interest of the people, and in a way that simultaneously aligns with their own
interests. As long as the short-term benefits that derive from illegal land
transfers and corruption continue to inure to the vast majority of government
regulators who are guilty of such misconduct, cases similar to Jiahe will
continue to transpire.
B. Lack of Compensation and Process in Beijing and Guangzhou
One continuing reason for the widespread land corruption has been
that cities boasting industrial or commercial facilities which succeed in
attracting foreign investment and generating new jobs are allowed to expand
and convert agricultural land to urban use. 129  Although Articles 43 and 63
of the LML restrict the State's ability to use rural land for construction or
nonagricultural use without approval, such approval is not difficult to obtain.
The State first requisitions the land to make it State-owned and can obtain
permission to do so from the municipal or county government branch of
SLAB. 130  SLAB is expected, in theory, to consider whether the project will
have net socioeconomic benefit for the surrounding area and whether there
127 See Qu Jintie, Hunan Yaoqiu Lingdao Ganbu Yao Jiqu Jiahe Shijian Jiaoxunmo Lanyong Quanli
[Hunan Demands that Party Leaders Draw Lessons from the Abuse of Power in Jiahe] CHANGSHA WAN
BAO, June 23, 2004, available at http://news.sohu.com/2004/06/23/02/news2206702I1.shtrd (last visited
June 8, 2005).
12s See 'Barbaric'Relocation Outlawed, CHINA DAILY, Mar. 8, 2005, available at http://www.china
daily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-03/08/content_422825.htm (last visited June 8, 2005).
'29 See Kremzner, supra note 19, at 648.
130 Governments subordinate to the provincial-level government do not have the power to approve
reallocation of land use. See New Policy, supra note 6.
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are adequate supplies of arable land for local food needs.131  In reality,
however, authorization is given freely, and the result has led to alarm at the
top levels over China's rapid loss of arable land and the resulting threat to
the nation's food supplies.
Last year in Beijing, the New York Times reported a case in which
Zhang Yuchen, a former senior official in the municipal construction bureau,
had secured rights to a sprawling parcel of wheat fields, on which he built
his luxury, dream chateau.' 33  The land had previously been farmed by a
collective of Yangge Village peasants. When officials of the Changping
District in Beijing agreed to let Zhang develop the land, the peasants'
understanding was that the requisitioned area would be converted from
farmland to a conservation zone, and that Zhang could only lease out land on
the condition that it would remain mostly green space.1 34  Zhang promised
younger, abler peasants that they would be able to find employment on the
newly developed estate, while the elderly were assured a U.S. $45 monthly
stipend. 1
35
Changping District eventually made the chateau a part of its annual
plan (niandujihua).136 Local leaders were to take the fees paid by Zhang to
start companies, the shares in which would be distributed to all who had
farmed the land. 137  But Yangge residents now claim that no shares were
ever issued and that no companies exist 138-a story that is less than
surprising given the context in which it arises. Previously stakeholders in
the land and its conversion, the peasants ultimately had their interests
severed from the ongoing development of the land.
According to researchers at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
("CASS") in Beijing, approximately 66.3 million people employed in
agriculture lost their land between 1990 and 2002,139 a number expected to
eventually rise above 100 million. 14  A recent editorial in China Daily
131 Kremzner, supra note 19, at 646-47.
132 See Jim Yardley, Farmers Being Moved Aside By China's Real Estate Boom, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8,
2004, at 1, available at LEXIS, Nexis Library, ALLNWS File.
133 See generally Joseph Kahn, China's Elite Learn to Flaunt It While the Landless Weep, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 25, 2004, at 1, available at LEXIS, Nexis Library, ALLNWS File.
134 id.
135 Id.
136 Id. Each year, municipal governments prepare an "annual land use plan for construction" (niandu
jianshe yongdi jihua), which is submitted to the State Planning Commission and made a part of the
"national economic and social development plans" (guominjingji he shehuifazhanjihua). See Kremzner,
supra note 19, at 646.
137 See Kahn, supra note 133.
138 id.
139 See Zhao, supra note 98, pt. II.
140 See Yardley, supra note 132.
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noted that 166,000 to 200,000 hectares of land are needed for urban
construction each year, and that this figure translates into the loss of land for
2.5 to 3 million farmers per year. 41 In addition, the MLR recently
disclosed that Chinese peasants are owed more than 15 billion renminbi in
unpaid compensation for land requisitions 142 and that it disciplined officials
involved in about 168,000 illegal land deals in 2003.143 Other government
statistics reflect that during the first part of 2004, 46,900 cases of illegal land
activities impacted rural areas. 144
Multiple provisions written into the October Decision do reflect an
attempt to control the problems presented by the Yangge case. For example,
projects altering what had originally been set forth in the locality's
comprehensive land utilization plan (tudi liyong zongti guihua)145 must first
be submitted for approval. 146  Localities not already providing for specific
transfer and development of arable land in their plans may not receive
subsequent permission to do so, and those in arrears on land requisition
compensation at the end of 2004 may not add land to their existing quotas
for 2005.47
Moreover, recognizing that farmland is fundamental to safeguarding
China's ability to feed its people, the October Decision also urges that any
revisions made to comprehensive plans must maintain the existing level of
"basic farmland" (jiben nongtian), prohibiting development and conversion
of such land into "agricultural industrial installations" or "modern
agricultural parks.'" To deal with those localities that have attempted to
exploit loopholes in the land law, Article 10 further forbids cities from
141 See Protecting Farmers' Interests, CHINA DAILY, Feb. 23, 2005, available at
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/englisldoc/2005-02/23/content_418654.htm (last visited June 8, 2005).142 See Shi Ting, New Policies to Ease Pain of Land Loss, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 16,
2004, available at LEXIS, News Library. On March 7, 2005, Vice Minister Li Yuan of Land and
Resources reported that the central government has now cleared up 17.5 billion renminbi (U.S. $2 billion)
of defaulted payment to farmers and taken over 12.3 billion renminbi (some U.S. $1.5 billion) owed by
local governments. See China Cuts Development Zones by 70 Pct in 2004, XINHUA NET (Beijing), Mar. 7,
2005, available at http://news.xinhuanet.comenglish/2005-03/07/content_2662322.htm (last visited June 8,
2005).
141 See Edward Cody, China's Land Grabs Raise Specter of Popular Unrest, WASH. POST, Oct. 5,
2004, at Al, available at LEXIS, Nexis Library, ALLNWS File.
l4 See Zhao, supra note 98, pt. I.
145 The comprehensive land utilization plan prepared by each level of government must be approved
by the next higher level of government before being implemented. See Land Management Law, supra
note 43, art. 15. SLAB prepares the comprehensive land utilization plan at the national level and plays a
key role at lower levels of government. See Kremzner, supra note 19, at 645. These plans are designed
to balance agricultural and non-agricultural land uses and guide the overall course and direction of urban
development. Id.
See October Decision, supra note 122, art. 6.
147 Id. art. 8.
141 See id. art. 11.
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requisitioning collectively owned land without authorization by making
peasants into urban residents 49 -and thus nullifying the collective.
Such reforms have not been enough to appease peasants who rely on
the land not only as their home, but also as their source of livelihood. Of
60,000 news pieces studied by CASS between August 2003 and June 2004,
the number one subject of concern among peasants shifted from the crisis in
taxation of the mid-1980s and 1990s to the crisis over land management.
50
Land disputes triggered eighty-seven out of 130 cases of rural disturbances
in 2004-a figure reflecting the move of peasant activism from tax disputes
to property rights, according to Professor Yu Jianrong, a rural development
researcher at CASS. 151 Another figure reported by the Party-controlled
Outlook magazine shows that more than three million participants were
involved in approximately 58,000 protests across China during 2003 alone, a
fifteen percent increase from 2002.152
For the central government, curbing such unrest is a matter crucial to
Party survival. In a survey conducted by the Party's Central Committee
153
in November 2004, the widening income gap ranked as the greatest concern
among Party officials, mainly because of its ability to stir social unrest.'
54
When 50,000 to 60,000 protested over the relocation of 100,000 residents to
make way for the Pubugou Dam in Hanyuan County, Sichuan Province, the
central government immediately dispatched 6000 soldiers from the People's
Armed Police, 155 as well as a work team led by State Council Executive
Deputy Secretary General Wang Yang to pacify the protesters. 56  In a sign
of apparent helplessness, the government even mandated a nationwide media
blackout. 
57
149 Id. art 10. This practice may be based on the loophole in Article 2(5) of the Management
Regulations, which states that collectively-owned land becomes urban land when all of the residents of the
collective become urban residents.
i'0 Id. Peasants' taxes accounted for only 1.9% of news stories during this time period. Id.
151 Id.
152 See Dam Project Sparks Rights, TAIPEI TIMES, Nov. 7, 2004, at 4, available at
http://www.taipeitimes.comlNewslworld/archives/2004/l110712003210020 (last visited June 8, 2005)
[hereinafter Dam Project].
153 The Central Committee's primary task is to elect the Politburo, a group of about twenty
representatives charged with meeting weekly to discuss the daily running of the country. See Rosenberg,
supra note 119, at 228.
154 See Kahn, supra note 133.
11 See Dam Project, supra note 152.
1'6 See CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA: VIRTUAL ACADEMY, MASSIVE
PROTESTS ERUPT IN SICHUAN, PROTESTORS BRIEFLY DETAIN PROVINCIAL PARTY SECRETARY (Nov. 19,
2004), available at http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=3105 (last visited June
8, 2005).
157 See Dam Project, supra note 152. An earlier circular issued by the State Council has provided
the means for a media clamp-down on stories related to demolition and relocation. It encourages local
governments to "[p]ersist in the correct guidance of public opinion and give full play to media
JUNE 2005
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
Measures such as the October Decision reflect the mounting concern
over land disputes impacting rural residents. Both domestic and
international media tend to label these disputes "tireless campaign[s] for
higher compensation,"' 58 but the fury often escalates over matters other than
compensation. Officials confiscate land "in the name of the public
interest," without even considering what the public's interests may be,
exploiting provisions in Chinese law that allow them to dictate both the
definition of "public interest," as well as the amount of compensation.
159
The issue for many is not just the payout, but the rhetoric and process used
to justify seizure of property from rural and urban residents alike. 160
Indeed, it is not only rural residents whose anger is mounting. In
Guangdong Province, for example, provincial Party Secretary Zhang
Dejiang endorsed Xiao Guwei, an island in the Pearl River off Guangzhou,
as the site for his U.S. $2.4 billion pet project, a school campus to be called
"University Town."' 16 1  Roughly 10,000 farmers were forced to relocate
between October 2003 and 2004, but more affluent urban residents felt the
impact as well. 162  Liang Xufeng, a successful landscaper, came home from
a business trip with his wife to find that his house had already been
destroyed by police and demolition crews during his absence.163  Echoing
the complaints of others, he claimed that the U.S. $280,000 offered in
compensation was only a fraction of the market value of his house.'
64
Another resident, art professor Chu Jiaquan, who joined neighbors in a
continuing public relations and court battle against the government, insisted,
"It's not the money. It's the way they treat us."'
' 65
It is not uncommon for residents like those in Guangzhou to receive
notice just days before the government expects to move them Out. 166  The
supervision," emphasizing "social stability" and the need to guard against "inducing and intensifying
contradictions." Guowuyuan Bangongting Guanyu Kongzhi Chengzhen Fangwu Chaiqian Guimo Yange
Chaiqian Guanli de Tongzhi [State Council Circular on Controlling the Scope of Housing Demolition and
Relocation in Cities and Towns and Tightening Up Demolition and Relocation Management] (issued June 6,
2004, effective Oct. 2004) art. 10, available at http://www.lawllO.com/law/guowuyuan/2152.htm (last
visited June 8, 2005).
158 See Kahn, supra note 133.
159 See Cody, supra note 143.
160 The CASS study shows that of all written appeals sent to authorities regarding land disputes,
thirty-three percent concerned land disputes in which compensation was seen as too low, while twenty-
three percent concerned those in which land was illegally or forcefully confiscated. See Zhao, supra note
98, pt. I.
l61 See Cody, supra note 143.
162 id.
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 See Sara Meg Davis & Lin Hai, Demolished: Forced Evictions and the Tenants' Rights Movement
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law does not require that they be consulted or notified about development
projects on their land and varies greatly regarding how much, and how far in
advance, information about the potential eviction should be provided.
167
MLR measures requiring public announcement of the terms of requisition
fail to specify even that the announcement be made in advance of the
requisition. 168  Similarly, State Council regulations provide only that the
plans, details and timing of urban development projects should be publicly
announced, without providing for a minimum time period between
announcement and actual eviction and demolition.
1 69
To ease the transition, certain administrative regulations provide that
collectives and individual farmers may raise objections over resettlement
and compensation (buchang anzhi) terms and request a hearing within ten
days of the announcement. 70  In urban areas, local governments are merely
obligated to notify residents prior to approval or alteration of the relevant
eviction or demolition plan. 171  The Ministry of Construction has also
pushed for prior appraisal, based on market price, of the buildings to be
demolished. 72  However, whether in the countryside or in the big cities, the
decision to requisition and evict is rarely subject either to public scrutiny or
participation. Before they have had an opportunity to voice their
grievances, those displaced have often already lost their homes and
livelihood and face an uphill battle in getting compensation for their losses.
in China, 16 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH No. 4 (C), 12 (2004).
"'1 See id. at 12-13.
168 See Zhengyong Tudi Gonggao Banfa [Measures on Public Announcement of Land Requisition]
(issued on Oct. 22, 2001 by the MLR, effective Jan. 1, 2002) art. 10, available at http://www.agri.gov.cn/
zcfg/t20030624_94279.htm (last visited June 8, 2005) [hereinafter Zhengyong Banfa].
169 See Chengshi Fangwu Chaiqian Guanli Tiaoli [Administrative Regulations on Urban House
Demolition and Relocation] (issued on June 13, 2001 by the State Council, effective Nov. 1, 2001,
superceding Mar. 22, 1991 version) art. 8, available at http://www.lawllO.com/law/guowuyuan2055.htm
(last visited June 8, 2005) [hereinafter Chengshi Tiaoli].
170 Zhengyong Banfa, art. 9. See also Guotu Ziyuan Tingzheng Guiding [Provisions on Land and
Resources Hearings] (issued on Feb. 10, 2004 by the MLR, effective May 1, 2004), available at
http://www.lawl 10.com/law/tudi/12179.htm (last visited June 8, 2005).
171 See Guanyu Renzhen Zuohao Chengzhen Fangwu Gongzuo Weihu Shehui Wending de Jinji
Tongzhi [Urgent Circular Concerning Better Implementation of Urban Development to Protect Societal
Stability] (issued on Sept. 19, 2003 by the State Council), available at http://www.lawlIO.com/law/
guowuyuan/2115.htm (last visited June 8, 2005).
See Chengshi Fangwu Chaiqian Jiage Zhidao Yijian [Opinion Guiding Urban Demolition and
Relocation Compensation] (issued on Dec. 1, 2003 by the Ministry of Construction, effective Jan. 1, 2004),
available at http://www.lawlIlO.comllaw/jianshe/2406.htm (last visited June 8, 2005). In rural areas,
compensation is "six to ten times the average annual output value of the requisitioned land for the three
years preceding such requisition," plus the amount calculated by the provincial land administration bureau
for "attachments and young crops." See Land Management Law, art. 47. In addition, the government
should calculate a resettlement subsidy based on the average amount of land requisitioned per person, with
a minimum amount of four to six times the average annual output value of each unit of land for the three
years preceding the requisition. Id.
JUNE 2005
PACIFIC Rim LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
C. Lack of Recourse in Liaoning Province
The particular set of obstacles faced by a group of peasants from a
suburban district of Shenyang, in the northern province of Liaoning, has
been followed with some interest by the State media. The group's troubles
began in late 2001, when the State Council approved Shenyang's request to
requisition their land for municipal construction. 173  Notice was issued in
January 2002 by the Liaoning provincial government, informing the
peasants that a total of 284,723 hectares would be requisitioned. 174
Dissatisfied with the resettlement and compensation terms announced in
March, the peasants complained to the village committee, which told them
that it did not have authority over compensation rates. 75
Led by Shi Hongxue, the group then went to the district government,
which directed them to the Yuhong District office of Shenyang's Planning,
Land and Resources Bureau. 176  Bureau officials ignored the peasants'
demands and instead instructed them on March 22 to vacate their land,
organizing a forced eviction on March 26.177 The peasants struck back with
an administrative lawsuit brought before the Yuhong District People's Court,
which refused to exercise jurisdiction over the compensation matter,
although it did rule that the bureau had proceeded illegally with eviction. 178
Pursuant to procedures set forth in the Implementing Regulations
under the LML ("Management Regulations"), 79 the group appealed in
January 2003 to the Liaoning Provincial People's Government.8 After the
provincial government's Legal Office said that it could not judge the case,
and that the appropriate agency to do so would be the Liaoning Provincial
Land and Resources Bureau ("LRB"), the group went to the Liaoning
LRB. 181  There, they hit another roadblock: at first, they were advised that
they again had gone to the wrong body for resolution; then, in December
173 See Fan Hongping, Shenyang Qi Tudi Chengbaozhe Zhuang Gao Guotu Ziyuan Bu Baisu [Seven
Shenyang Peasants Lose Suit against Ministry of Land and Resources], ZHONGGUo FAYIAN WANG [CHINA
COURT NET], Dec. 9, 2004, available at http://www.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=142221 (last
visited June 8, 2005).
174 id.
175 See Li Shen & Wang Ruyue, Ministry Sued by Frustrated Farmers, Oct. 29, 2004, available at
http://service.china.org.cn/link/wcm/ShowText?info-id=110688&p.qry=Land (last visited June 8, 2005).
176 id.
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 Article 25 states that "In the event of dispute over the standard of compensation ... it shall be
ruled upon by the people's government approving the requisition and land use." Management Regulations,
art. 25.
:8o See Fan, supra note 173.
81' Id.
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2003, they were told that the compensation terms were supported by the
authorizing documentation.112
At this point, attorney Lu Guang joined in the efforts and questioned
the legal validity of "Approval No. 559," the MLR document authorizing
requisition and construction. 183  With his assistance, the group sent a
request to the MLR in December 2003 to invalidate the Liaoning LRB's
position, followed by a personal visit to the ministry to petition their
grievances (shangfang).184 The bureau initially insisted that it could not
rule on behalf of the provincial government on the matter, and then, upon the
group's appeal for reconsideration, announced in July 2004 its support for
the Liaoning LRB's decision.' 85  In August, the peasants filed a suit against
the MLR in the First Intermediate People's Court in Beijing, arguing that the
MLR had exceeded the scope of its authority in issuing Approval No. 559,
thus violating the group's rights.
18 6
The First Intermediate People's Court issued a very narrow ruling on
the case, reasoning in circular fashion that: State law provides for State
Council approval of a city's annual plan, subsequent to which the MLR may
authorize individual applications for land use and construction; thus the
MLR was empowered to issue Approval No. 559, because State law allows
it to do so. 87  This decision demonstrated the Court's refusal to review the
MLR's actions for potential error or abuse--either disregarding as irrelevant,
or taking as given, the legitimacy of the agency's decision.
The Shenyang case raises issues clearly unresolved by the reforms of
the October Decision and December Circular. Initially approved in 2001,
the development project was not challenged due to a failure to pay land-use
fees or conform to land law or policy. Instead, the case highlights the
confusion and inconsistencies inherent in the mechanism of Chinese land
management, shuttling the aggrieved from local government office to
courthouse to agency, and then back again.' 88  More importantly, like so
12 This included the second version of Shenyang's 2001 annual city plan, approved by the State
Council, and an MLR document (559 Hao "Guanyu Shenyangshi Chengshi Jianshe Nongyongdi
Zhuanyong he Tudi Zhengyong de Pifu" [Approval No. 559 "Concerning Review of Shenyang City's
Application for Requisition and Transformation of Agricultural Land for Municipal Construction"])
approving the requisition and transformation of the peasants' land for non-agricultural purposes. Id.
183 See Li, supra note 175.
184 id.
185 See Fan, supra note 173.
186 id.
187 Id.
'8' In a similar case brought by a group of 150 peasants from Hongqiao village in Jiangsu province,
the aggrieved first made a personal visit in May 2004 to the MLR to petition their grievances and then sent
the agency a request for administrative reconsideration. In March, the Beijing No. 1 Intermediate People's
Court ruled in their favor and ordered the MLR to review its prior approval of the local government's
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many other cases of land dispute, what transpired in Shenyang reveals a
general reluctance by Chinese courts to exercise jurisdiction (li'an) over
such matters due to pressures from local officials.189
Indeed, figures show that only 3948 cases involving real estate
disputes were handled by Beijing courts in 2003,190 while an overwhelming
18,620 complaints were filed directly with the Ministry of Construction in
the first half of 2004 alone. 19' A study of 20,000 letters to media outlets
included those written by 720 peasants who had traveled to Beijing to
directly petition authorities.' 92  While complaints to government agencies
and media outlets have become increasingly important as alternative
channels for openly airing grievances, 193 Beijing has attempted to stop the
process of petitioning altogether, 194 and ordered a ban on news reports
regarding farmland requisitions.
195
In place of such alternatives, new procedures allow for parties unable
to reach agreement on resettlement and compensation terms to apply for
decision to requisition the farmers' land. However, commentary on this case points out that the court
failed to actually invalidate the MLR's original decision to approve the land requisition, meaning that the
peasants might end up on a similar journey as their Liaoning counterparts. For additional information
related to the Jiangsu case, see Wang Yang, 150 Ming Wuxi Nongmin Gao Guotu Ziyuann Bu An Zuo
Kaiting [Trial of 150 Wuxi Peasants Versus MLR Opens Yesterday], XINHUA NET, Jan. 25, 2005, available
at http://www.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id= 148046 (last visited June 8, 2005).
'9 The Chinese judicial process allows local Party committees to decide which cases are heard by the
courts. See Davis & Lin Hai, supra note 167, at 17.
o See China Mulls Property Law to Secure Ownership, CHINA DAILY, Oct. 23, 2004, § 2, available
at http://www2.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-10/23/content_385045.htm (last visited June 8, 2005)
[hereinafter Secure Ownership].
191 As of June 22, 2004, this figure had already exceeded the 18,071 complaints filed during all of
2003. Jianshebu: Jinnian Shangbannian Zhengdi Chaiqian Shangfang Chaoguo Qunian Zongliang
[Ministry of Construction: Petitions Over Requisition and Demolition in the First Half of the Year Surpass
Total Figures From Last Year], BEJING NEWS, July 5, 2004, available at http://www.people.com.cn/
GB/guandian/2618209.html (last visited June 8, 2005). According to Deputy Minister Fu Wenjia, the
2004 figure includes more than 3000 individual complaints, representing 5397 people, and more than 900
group complaints, representing 13,223 people. Id.
192 Zhao, supra note 98, pt. I. Hundreds of desperate peasants carry their receipts, legal rulings, and
even medical records to Beijing each year. See Yardley, supra note 132, sec. 3. The system of
"petitioning" has its roots in hundreds of years of Chinese tradition, which allowed local peasants to go to
the capital to seek audience with the emperor's court. See id.; Robert J. Saiget, Chinese Finding It Harder
to Find Justice, Despite Human Rights Guarantee, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE (Beijing), Apr. 15, 2004,
available at LEXIS, News Library.
193 Saiget, supra note 192. One petitioner noted: "You have to stay in Beijing to complain because
there are so many ministries and departments. You can complain at the State Council, Supreme People's
Court... National People's Congress and the Supreme People's Procuratorate." Id.
'94 In March 2004, NPC Chairman Wu Bangguo ordered local governments to stop petitioners from
going to the capital and mandated that local complaints bureaus handle the issues instead. See id.
19 Beijing's publicity department has ordered media organizations to cease reporting on cases of
farmland acquisition by local officials. Josephine Ma, Reporting of Farmland Seizures Outlawed: Sources
Say Media Crackdown Extends to Coverage of Outspoken Economist, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 7,
2004, available at http://www.scmp.com (last visited June 8, 2005).
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administrative adjudication.' 96  However, the adjudication focuses only on
the terms, rather than the actual validity of the requisition or eviction, and is
conducted by the same local bureau that authorized the action in the first
place. 197 Given these conflicts of interest, the new rules will prove
ineffectual unless the entire process can be taken out of the hands of
agencies with vested interests adverse to the complainants' interests. 198  The
need for displaced residents "to take their problems to court instead of taking
them to the streets" cannot be realized absent a court system and
mechanisms for alternative dispute resolution, which can be strengthened
and made more independent.' 99
IV. DIGGING DEEPER: A RIGHTS-BASED FRAMEWORK FOR CHINA'S NEW
HOUSE
To return to the question posed in Part II, it appears crucial at this
point to ask whether newly promoted property rights can realistically be
enforced against the backdrop of China's governing ideology. China
scholar Michael Dowdle notes:
Compared with mature legal systems, China's legal system
is significantly less transparent, predictable, and consistent;
does not offer the same quality of protections for economic,
constitutional, and human rights; and does not exercise the
same quality of influence over other political (and private)
actors. 'Rule of law' might be regarded simply as an adjective
indicating the presence of some or all of these systemic abilities.
And if this is the case, then it is clear that China does not enjoy
rule of law. 20
0
But even as the Chinese appear to demonstrate such ambivalence toward the
rule of law in practice,2°' their leadership adamantly proclaims support for
196 See Chengshi Fangwu Chaiqian Xingzheng Caijue Gongzuo Guicheng [Administrative
Adjudication of Urban Housing Demolition and Relocation] (issued on Dec. 30, 2003 by the Ministry of
Construction, effective Mar. 1, 2004), available at http://big5.china.com.cn/chinese/PI-c/472789.htm (last
visited June 8, 2005).
'9' Id. arts. 2-3.
'9' See Davis & Lin Hai, supra note 167, at 35.
199 Press Release, Human Rights Watch, China: Forced Evictions Spur Protests (Mar. 25, 2004),
available at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/03/22/china8159.htm (last visited June 8, 2005).
200 Michael W. Dowdle, Heretical Laments: China and the Fallacies of 'Rule of Law,' 11 CULTURAL
DYNAMICS 287, 301 (1999).
201 Id. (citing William P. Alford, A Second Great Wall? China's Post-Cultural Revolution Project of
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the supremacy of law in theory.202
This section argues that significant principles of Western liberalism,
including those relating to human rights and limitations on the power of
government, do in fact exist in Chinese legal and political consciousness.
But in chasing after modernity and modeling its legal reform efforts
predominantly after the experience of the Americans, China's greatest failure
has been its disregard of some of the crucial assumptions-and
framework-upon which the American rights infrastructure was built.
A. Reaffirming Human Rights in a Global World Order
Since reform and liberalization (gaige kaifang) in 1978, China has
been on an accelerated path toward economic development. With the
private sector accounting for roughly three-quarters of employment, two-
thirds of GDP and one-half of residential and industrial property value, 20 3 it
is difficult to argue that the nation will be in "transition" forever. While a
malleable property rights regime works, and is acceptable, for transitional
economies, there is a "need [for] laws and institutions appropriate for the
post-transition economic order., 20 4  China legal scholars have recognized
this urgency, emphasizing that greater protection of private property helps
contribute to the national economy by making transactions more transparent
and dissemination of information more open, thereby instilling confidence in
both investors and consumers.2 °5
Land is unique as a form of private property, arguably functioning as a
commodity not only relied upon by the individual, but also utilized for the
public good and benefit of the State. Ideally, an economically powerful
State would raise both the profit level for commercial interests and the basic
standard of living for common citizens. But while the governing property
regime allows private enterprise to take part in the business of marketizing
206China, it has excluded the average individual from the process.
A system of land management that vests property rights in the hands
of the economic, and thus political, elite seems contrary to fundamental
principles underlying much of Western liberal thinking. John Locke's
Legal Construction, 11 CULTuRAL DYNAMICS 193 (1999)).
2o2 Id.; see also CHEN, supra note 16, at 3.
203 See Alsen, supra note 15, at 3.
204 deLisle, supra note 24, at 6.
2o5 See Secure Ownership, supra note 190 (quoting BaoYujun, Chairman of the Beijing-based
Institution on the Promotion of Private Economy, and Renmin University Professor Wang Liming, one of
the leading authors of the draft property law expected to be approved in 2005).
206 See, e.g., discussion supra Part II.B.2 & IIl (providing numerous examples of individual residents
struggling to exercise leverage against the government and developers).
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description of property as predating sovereign power plays a central role in
207the West. Under traditional Lockean theory, private property rights can
only be exercised "where there is enough and as good left in common for
others.,208
In addition, under the international human rights regime, certain
fundamental rights are meant to govern universally and keep in check
potential State overreaching.209 The United Nations Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, entrusted with authoritatively
interpreting the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, defines "forced eviction" as "the permanent or temporary removal
against their will of individuals, families and/or communities from the
homes and/or land which they occupy, without the provision of, and access
to, appropriate forms of legal or other protection. 21°  China, having ratified
the covenant on June 27, 2001, is bound by the understanding that forced
eviction is "prima facie incompatible" with the covenant's requirements. 211
Recent Chinese constitutional and legislative texts, books, articles and
official propaganda materials do affirm the significance of key principles of
Western liberalism. 212  They include language about human rights, about
the state as a product of a social contract (in the sense that the authority and
legitimacy of government is derived from the consent of the governed), and
about the need for governmental power to be regulated, limited and
controlled by law so as to minimize abuse of power or invasion of citizens'
rights.21 3 In theory, then, China seems to be moving beyond the realization
that property rights are crucial only to economic development, and to some
extent recognizing that human rights are fundamental to social development.
The traditional Western-and American-concept of safeguarding
life and liberty, as well as property, has thus become a part of China's more
recent rights discourse, with influential legal scholars insisting on the
207 See James S. Burling, Private Property Rights and the Environment After Palazzalo, 30 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 1, 3-5, 40, 51,62 (2002).
20. JOHN LOCKE, The Second Treatise of Civil Government § 27, at 134, in Two TREATISES OF
GOVERNMENT (Thomas 1. Cook ed., Hafner Publishing Co. 1947) (1690).209 See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA. Res. 217A (HI), U.N. Doc A/810, arts. 3
(providing for security of person), 12 (prohibiting arbitrary interference with home), 13 (providing for
freedom of movement and residence), 17 (establishing property ownership and protection guarantees), 25
(establishing a basic standard for adequate housing) (1948). The United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights notes that all of the preceding are implicated in cases of forced eviction. See U.N. HIGH
COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, FORCED EVICTIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, U.N.H.C.R. Fact Sheet No.
25 (1996), available at http:/www.unhchr.ch/htmllmenu6/21fs25.htm (last visited June 8, 2005).
210 See Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights:
General Comment No. 7, U.N. ESCOR, 16th Sess., 4, U.N. Doc. E/C. 12/1997/4 (1997).211 See id.
2:2 See CHEN, supra note 16, at 3.
21 id.
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significance of all three key civil rights in reform efforts.214 A few go even
further, to claim that the right to property is the most sacred of the three, and
that security over one's property is a prerequisite to ensuring security over
one's person.215  A recent Chinese editorial quotes from the discourse in the
West to point out that even the poorest should be able to oppose the authority
of the sovereign while in his own home: "Wind can come in, rain can come
,,216in, whereas only the king cannot come in.
Human rights have in this way been promoted from "a concept
formerly criticized in China to a constitutional law concept,, 217 bringing to
a head debates about private property and recent discussions related to
constitutional reform. Critics at the grassroots level and in senior levels of
government now openly debate the degree to which China's Constitution
does, or should, protect property,2 18 but notably do so by dressing up their
arguments in language that is characteristically Chinese. They are able to
argue that the protection of private property is necessary, only to the extent
that it relates to the interests of the "whole people.1
219
By insisting that the poor also stand to benefit from protection of
private property and arguing that acknowledgment of this fact will help to
220
mitigate the tensions between rich and poor, critics have effectively
played into the fears and concerns of the highest-level leadership. What is
needed to transform the theory behind the new rights discourse into actual
practical safeguards is just this type of recognition that respect for the
private property rights of the individual is in keeping both with the Party's
efforts to maintain social stability-and thus legitimacy-and with its
attempt to gain recognition as a rule-of-law state (fazhi guojia) on the
international scene.
214 Liao Weihua, Wuquanfa Caoan You Xiwang Sanshen Tongguo [Hope for Passage of Property Law
Draft at Third Session [ofNPC]], BEIJING NEWS, Oct. 24, 2004, at A-2.
215 See Cao, supra note 60, sec. 3, para. 2; Zhu Sipei, Shuping: Wuquanfa Shi Baohu Sichan De
Xianzheng Xuyao [Editorial: Property Law a Necessity for Protection of Private Property in a
Constitutional Government], ZHENGYI WANG [JUSTICE NET], Oct. 27, 2004, available at
http://www.jcrb.conzywIn4O6/ca308898.htm (last visited June 8, 2005).
216 Id.
217 Cao, supra note 60, sec. 3, para. 1.
218 These critics point to articles 10 (addressing reallocation of property rights), 13 (protection of the
rights of individuals to income, savings, residence and inheritance) and 39 (prohibiting illegal search or
entry). See Davis & Lin Hai, supra note 167, at 32.
219 See Cao, supra note 60, sec. 3, para. 2.
220 Id.
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B. The Compensation Quandary
At a recent lecture on constitutional studies, President Xiao Yang of
the Supreme People's Court, China's highest judicial organ, commented that
courts should prevent infringement of citizens' legal roperty rights and
provide for "proper and reasonable compensations. The frenzy over
determining the right measure of compensation echoes similar efforts in the
United States designed to provide a mechanism for alleviating the public
222anger that arises over land abuses. Yet while the Fifth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution mandates "just compensation" guided by a measure of
market value,223 China's constitutional equivalent leaves the amount of
compensation for government seizure of land undefined. 224 Absent
benchmarks, litigation over compensation terms has become a chaotic
endeavor-as in the Shenyang case.
225
There is legitimacy to the argument that "[in a] country without [a]
clear private property concept, where rights are not well granted ex ante, it is
not unusual that people have to fight for actual control over the property, ex
post. '226  Pending resolution of a land dispute in China, one cannot get a
judicial injunction to prevent the planned demolition. 227 Because
demolition may proceed even before lawsuits have been decided, the ability
to seize and demolish the property does not become a point of contention.
Actual control over the property is effectively conceded to the government,
and the "fight" by default focuses heavily on determination of the
compensation terms, ex post facto.
It is important to recognize that ex post measures are, in general, less
228effective than ex ante ones and, in China, misguided in their objectives.
221 Courts Urged to Protect Citizens' Property Rights, XINHUA, June 19, 2004, available at
http://english.com.cn//200406/19/eng200406l9-l46855.htn (last visited June 8, 2005). Development
companies have preferred to compensate urban residents and resettle them into suburban areas, rather than
rehouse them at subsidized prices in their original inner-city neighborhoods. Junhua L0, Beijing's Old and
Dilapidated Housing Renewal, 14 CIES 59, 68 (Daniel B. Abramson trans., 1996). However,
compensation has become a flashpoint, as property values rise in the areas from which residents are
typically being resettled. See Davis & Lin Hal, supra note 167, at 15.
222 According to urban planning scholars, only one-half of all people displaced from their homes and
neighborhoods received relocation payment during the urban renewal period of the 1950s and 1960s in
America. See Zhang & Fang, supra note 9, at 289.
2213 See Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934) (holding that "[jiust compensation includes
all elements of value that inhere in the property, but it does not exceed market value fairly determined").
224 Even after the March 2004 amendments, Articles 10 and 13 of the Chinese Constitution merely
read that the State "shall pay compensation." XIANFA, supra note 14, arts. 10, 13.
225 See supra Part III.C.
226 See Pham, supra note 23, at 9.
227 See Management Regulations, supra note 43, art. 16.
228 Counsel for the petitioners in this year's Kelo v. City of New London case before the Supreme
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Compensation, as currently calculated, is both too harsh and not harsh
enough.229 In a best-case scenario, Chinese courts scrutinize these cases
based on a "regulator-as-tortfeasor" model, in which property owners are
viewed as injured parties whose interests have been harmed by the
government.2 3 ° Undue attention is paid to extreme cases of wrongdoing,
and select government representatives are punished in widely publicized
anti-corruption campaigns.231 In the United States, property owners have
been shown to "make excessive investment or inappropriate land use
decisions when they are fully compensated. 232  Wherever applied, the
model appears to distort the relevant incentive structure.
At the other end of things, while "recompense" may be great in China,
actual "compensation" is rarely so. Those who are wronged may enjoy the
satisfaction of seeing their wrongdoers publicly chastised, but the tangible
fruit of their victory is limited to a market-value standard failing to take into
account the real worth of the land. Whether in the United States or in
China, compensation is more often designed to take into account the current
value of the property, rather than its value after development is complete.233
But this type of standard, when applied in China, ignores the huge land
subsidy received by developers. By allocating land free of charge and
recognizing rights only in its usage, the Chinese government has allowed for
a payout rate that is merely nominal and easily afforded by developers able
to turn a huge profit in an overheated economy.
Focusing on an ex post compensation scheme has helped pave the way
for government to seize and clear land "in the name of the public interest,"
Court argued: "When all of the crucial determinations that will give rise to public benefit or private
advantage can be made after the condemnations take place, then the possibilities for abuse multiply
exponentially." Brief for Appellant at 46, Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 1241 (1986) (No. 04-
108) [hereinafter Kelo App. Brief].
229 In urban areas, the standard for compensation set by the State Council is calculated based on the
full market value of properties, plus an (unspecified) amount for business loss in case of non-residential
properties. See Chengshi Tiaoli, supra note 169, art. 24.
230 See JAMES BOYD & TIMOTHY J. BRENNAN, PLURALISM AND REGULATORY FAILURE: WHEN
SHOULD TAKINGS TRIGGER COMPENSATION? 6-7 (1996) (explaining the regulator-as-tortfeasor model).
231 See, e.g., supra Part III.A for a discussion of the Jiahe case.
232 BOYD & BRENNAN, supra note 230, at 7.
233 Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy was in fact quick to remind counsel for the respondents
in Kelo v. City of New London that "[it is] a fundamental of [American] condemnation law that you cannot
value the property being taken based on what it's going to be worth after the project." Transcript at 50,
Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 1241 (1986) (No. 04-108) [hereinafter Kelo Transcript].
Monetary damages awarded for constitutional violations of either the Due Process Clause or Takings
Clause are legal remedies, not equitable ones. See Teamsters v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 570 (1990) (quoting
from Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196 (1974) to state that "[glenerally, an action for money damages
was 'the traditional form of relief offered in the courts of law"'); City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at
Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 710 (1999). As such, they take into account what the owner has lost, and
not what the taker has gained. Boston Chamber of Commerce v. Boston, 217 U.S. 189, 195 (1910).
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while allowing for large-scale commercial development that profits just a
few.234  Because compensation is designed to pay off private citizens for
government actions assumed to be legitimate and within the government's
power,235 it offers no effective solution to situations in which government
takings are made in error or public use is merely incidental to private (e.g.,
development company) gain.
As development companies opt to compensate and resettle residents
into China's suburban areas, rather than re-house them at subsidized prices
in their original inner-city neighborhoods, "the city's poorest residents can
only afford to move out farther and farther from the city center[, while] only
the most privileged can live [there]. 237  The Chinese government in effect
subsidizes the rich at a price that does not factor in the social costs borne by
the poor. Regardless of the amount received, compensation fails to take
into account the inability of evicted residents to afford rising property values
where they previously lived or find employment where they must now
238resettle. Faced with a similar battle over land in hot pursuit by
development companies, displaced residents in the United States pushed
Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia to ask whether taking property from
somebody who does not want to sell it counts for nothing.239
C. The Political Rhetoric of Building in the "Public Interest"
In China, as in the United States, the refusal to sell is not only a
holdout for more money, but perhaps the sole means through which the
economically and politically disadvantaged can carve out a space for
themselves, in a world of competing interests.24° Courts in the United
234 In New York, for example, the government used the power of eminent domain to seize and clear
the Columbus Circle area, even though only two percent was taken up by slums. See Zhang & Fang,
supra note 9, at 288. In Los Angeles, officials bulldozed a 315-acre tract of land planned for public
housing, only to use it later for a stadium owned and erected by the Los Angeles Dodgers baseball team.
See id.
235 This point is discussed in greater detail infra Part IV.C.
236 The issue of how to adequately measure compensation where property has been taken from one
private actor and transferred to another came up repeatedly during oral arguments in Kelo v. City of New
London. See Kelo Transcript, supra note 233, at 22-23, 45.
237 Lii supra note 221, at 68.
238 See Davis & Lin Hal, supra note 167, at 15; CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA,
ROUNDTABLE ON PROPERTY SEIZURES IN CHINA: POLITICS, LAW, AND PROTEST, app. A (June 21, 2004)
(prepared statement of Patrick Randolph, Professor, University of Missouri, Kansas City, School of Law)
[hereinafter Randolph].
239 See Kelo Transcript, supra note 233, at 39.
240 See id. at 40-41. There are admittedly a number of residents, referred to by the Chinese as "nail
households" (dingzi hu), who stubbornly remain in their homes simply to hold out for better compensation.
See Abramson, supra note 84, at 73. However, the existence of these holdouts by no means indicates that
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States have attempted to arm the poor and disadvantaged with two weapons:
"Weapon one is... compensation. And weapon two is [the ability to] put
[government] to a test of being reasonable. ' '24 1 In other words, American
courts are empowered to award monetary damages in the event that they
authorize condemnation to proceed, or they may prevent the condemnation
from proceeding if the government has failed to show a reasonable
foundation for its taking.242
Of course, "[w]hen [the United States] needed revitalized cities and
gentrification of the slums, we didn't stand too hard on Constitutional
principles, and this in a society that has limited government as a basic
principle.' 243  As a product of political liberalism in the wake of the New
Deal, the federal government intervened extensively in the economy and
passed legislation such as the Housing Act of 1949 (the "1949 Housing
Act"), embracing the belief that it must take on responsibility for addressing
social problems that plagued the nation. 244  The U.S. Supreme Court
certainly played its own role in "rubber-stamp[ing] the notion that
condemnation, redevelopment and resale to private developers is a
legitimate response to the problem of decaying central cities. 245
However, urban renewal in the United States took place within the
framework of a mature capitalist society, in which public and private sectors
were well-delineated. 246  "[N]eighborhood activism created a new 'political
space' which allowed, and sometimes forced, urban politicians and
administrators to interact with new contenders of power." 247  The 1954
Amendments were thus passed five years after launching Title I of the 1949
Housing Act, to respond to deficiencies in the bulldozer approach and
require local citizen participation in the development and execution of urban
renewal.248
Urban renewal in the United States also proceeded in the context of a
mature representative democracy. As pointed out by counsel for the
petitioners in Kelo v. City of New London, the Connecticut case mentioned in
Part I,
all who oppose eviction have done so for bargaining's sake.
241 See Kelo Transcript, supra note 233, at 41.
242 The Supreme Court is of the view that the judiciary may intervene in government takings for
public use, where the public use is "palpably without reasonable foundation." See Hawaii Housing
Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984).
243 Randolph, supra note 238.
244 Zhang & Fang, supra note 9, at 292.
245 Id. (citing to Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954)).
246 Id. at 293.
247 Id.
248 Id.
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When state and municipal officials make economic or social
policy decisions [in the United States], the people whom those
officials represent have the opportunity to voice their opinions
on those decisions at the next election. So if the choice is
disagreeable to enough people, the consequences of that
disagreement will become evident through the political
249process.
It is only on the basis of this underlying assumption that U.S. courts
have thus tended to "rubber-stamp" use of the eminent domain power and
deferred heavily to the legislature when it comes to condemnation for public
use.250  This is in keeping with the general view that the legislature is "the
appropriate representative body through which the public makes democratic
choices among alternative solutions to social and economic problems.,
251
In a recent case involving both due process and takings challenges to the
Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act, 25 2 Supreme Court Justice Breyer
therefore argued that the language of the Fifth Amendment's Takings
Clause 253 suggests that "at the heart of the Clause lies a concern, not with
preventing arbitrary or unfair government action, but with providing
compensation for legitimate government action that takes 'private property'
to serve the 'public' good. 254
U.S. case law at present steers clear of establishing a means-ends test
akin to that under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause,255 often
avoiding the question of whether the "means" resorted to in government
takings substantially advance a legitimate public "end." Illegitimate
takings conducted in bad faith are typically invalidated under the Due
Process Clause, rather than compensated under the Takings Clause.256 This
249 Brief for Respondent at 21, Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 1241 (1986) (No. 04-108)
[hereinafter Kelo Resp. Brief].
250 The Supreme Court has itself insisted the role of the judiciary "in reviewing a legislature's
judgment of what constitutes a public use, even when the eminent domain power is equated with the police
power.., is... extremely narrow..." (internal quotation marks omitted). Hawaii Housing Authority v.
Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240 (1984).
251 Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 230 (1981).
252 See Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998).
253 The Takings Clause follows the Due Process Clause and states: "nor shall private property be
taken for public use without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
254 Eastern Enterprises, 524 U.S. at 554 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
255 This clause states that "[njo person shall be... deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
256 More recently, the Supreme Court in City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd.
declined to rule definitively on whether the means-ends test is appropriate under a Takings Clause analysis.
See 526 U.S. 687 (1999). Although the Court appeared to base its ruling on a theory that the City of
Monterey failed to "substantially advance a legitimate public purpose," commentators argue that this
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is because "the notion that government errors can be challenged under the
Takings Clause... threatens to sweep away longstanding government
immunity rules ... and seriously interfere with elected officials' good faith
efforts to mediate competing social interests in the use and control of
property.
257
When applied to the China scenario, it becomes apparent that these
dichotomies in the American system are simply nonexistent in China. U.S.
takings law assumes that separate provision for evaluating whether due
process was taken into consideration already exists elsewhere. In cases
where the government has failed to ensure due process to those affected, the
American Constitution provides for a process of ex ante invalidation that has
no equivalent in Chinese law.258
In addition, the U.S. federal government's attempt to attract private
investment in its urban renewal program ultimately failed. 9  Without pro-
growth coalitions of the type seen in China, the American government's
interests have not run quite so counter to the public's interests. By contrast,
the distinction between private and public is too often ambiguous in China,
with local State-owned enterprises or other government-affiliated companies
orchestrating the urban redevelopment process and shutting out community
players .260
Without checks and balances of the type that exist in the United States,
it is misguided to rely on the principles and language of the Takings Clause
to resolve the conflicts brought about by government requisition and
condemnation in China. The American model is inappropriate not in its
theoretical ideals, but in its application to the Chinese system. It simply
assumes an underlying governmental structure and property infrastructure
different from the ones currently existing in China.
The absence of representative government prevents the will of the
popular majority from being expressed through legislation, and the last-
recourse nature of the courts makes it difficult to enforce constitutional
should not be seen as contradicting the views of the five Justices who had disavowed the means-ends test in
Eastern Enterprises. See John D. Echeverria, Symposium: When Does Retroactivity Cross the Line?:
Winstar Eastern Enterprises and Beyond: Takings and Errors, 51 ALA. L. REv. 1047, 1070-1071 (2000).
The Monterey court had to determine whether the government action was "tortious and unlawful," in order
to rule on a completely different question-whether the claim was analogous to a common law tort claim
and thus properly tried to a jury. id. Moreover, even those justices failing to question the role of the
means-ends test in Eastern Enterprises did so in Monterey. See Timothy J. Dowling, On History, Taking
Jurisprudence, and Palazzolo: A Reply to James Burling, 30 ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 65, 75 n.61-62 (2002).
Echeverria, supra note 257, at 1049.
2S8 See supra Part IV.B.
259 See Zhang & Fang, supra note 9, at 291.
26) See, e.g., supra Part II.B.2.
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rights protecting the expression of those functioning at the margins. With
only the State possessing the entire "bundle" of property rights (suoyouquan)
on behalf of the Chinese people, it becomes necessary to establish better
mechanisms for holding local officials accountable and empowering local
communities.261 China must construct a model that rests upon its own
unique culture and traditions, and in doing so, it may provide valuable
lessons from which the United States can draw.
V. PARTICIPATORY DECISION-MAKING AND DEMOCRATIZATION OF A
FLAWED PROCESS
Michael Dowdle posits that the appropriate mechanisms might not
have to do with the rule-of-law schemata conceptualized by the Western
world. Rather,
[t]he mere fact that China is deficient in some particular aspect
of its legal system, even one commonly associated with
acknowledged rule-of-law systems, is of little significance
unless it can be shown that that aspect would either promote
262
social coordination or help realize social justice in China.
This final section turns to the very argument that Chinese regulators
may "do better to focus primarily on developing more robust social networks
rather than on developing stronger rule-of-law institutions," in order to
achieve the dual aims of promoting social coordination and helping to
263
realize social justice. It further seeks to explore how such a development
tactic might be feasibly accomplished.
A. A Space for Imagination: New Models of Governance
Studies show that in China, displaced residents complain most, not
about the ends of displacement, but about its process. Even when
displaced residents are complaining about compensation itself, they are
261 As one Chinese legal scholar notes, there have been efforts to manage land better, strictly control
confiscation of land, raise compensation and improve the social conditions of landless peasants, but "the
first task of reformers should be to clarify peasants' rights, [and tihe nation's laws should be used to give
the land back to peasants." Zhao, supra note 98, pt. III (quoting CASS Professor Yu Jianrong).
262 Dowdle, supra note 200, at 302.
263 Id.
264 See, e.g., discussion supra Part III.B.; Cody, supra note 143 (noting concern by displaced
Guangzhou residents over the way in which they were treated).
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frequently complaining about the fact that they were forced-sometimes
against their will-to become parties to compensation agreements, which set
forth standards arbitrarily imposed by the central and municipal
governments. 265  Rather than continuing to perfect "outcome-based" tools
correcting for unbalanced political influence, it may be more crucial for
China to strengthen "organizational-based" rules, impacting the ability of•266
pro-growth coalitions to leverage such influence. In this way, land
reform may better allow for administration of new laws and regulations,
without need for coercion.
Part IV.C. of this Article raised the specter that "[t]he judiciary's role
as the 'least dangerous branch' makes it ill-suited for serving as the principal
defender of social justice. '267  Rule of law devices tend to promote social
justice through judicial protection of human rights, economic rights,
constitutional rights and due process, as well as judicial review of
administrative behavior.268 But such judicial mechanisms "are better seen
as supplements to other, more fundamental, means of generating social
order.
, 269
Moreover, law itself is not the only means through which codes of
conduct can be standardized and rationalized, and this helps to promote
greater social coordination. 270  Particularly in small-world environments,
"the disciplining force of reiterated transactions can sometimes be so strong
as to eliminate any need for formal legal regulation. 27' In addition to
developing more effective rule-of-law institutions in pursuit of this end,
government regulators are therefore well-advised to "encourag[e] the
development of small-world networks that link all the actors in the
environment, a model of regulation sometimes referred to as 'corporatism'
or 'neo-corporatism.' 2
72
A powerful example of successful corporatist or corporatist-like
regulatory schemes in the United States can be found in the extensive
writings of Columbia Law School professors Michael Dorf and Charles
265 Zhang, Urban Development, supra note 5, at 496.
266 Boyd & Brennan, supra note 230, at 10.
267 Dowdle, supra note 200, at 307 (emphasis in original).
265 See id.
269 Id.
270 Dowdle cites to the discussion by Max Weber and others of such other devices as legal consistency,
rationalized laws and regulatory jurisdictions, transparency, and public accountability. Id. at 302.271 Id. at 303.
272 Id. Present-day use of these terms refers to regulatory environments in which the State serves as
an intermediary between diverse, bargaining interests by reducing transaction costs. See id. at 309-310
n.9.
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Sabel.z73 Their model of "democratic experimentalism" is a "postmodern"
274
approach to the expansive modem regulatory state, and promotes social
networks over formal, bureaucratized structures, primarily through the
combining of decentralization and mutual monitoring to form a vision of
"directly deliberate polyarchy." 275  The process proposed is "direct,"
"deliberative" and a "polyarchy" because it is meant not only to empower
citizens by giving them a voice in decision-making, but also to recognize the
plurality of voices in the process of government deliberation generally.
276
This experimentalist vision rests upon the notion that there is a
cooperative element to today's new corporate structure, one in which the
close integration of all actors helps to eliminate problems of hold-up through
277
a richer exchange of information. Toyota Motor Corporation, for
example, was able to manufacture its optimal car through a production
process beyond the control of any individual group, but which depended
upon each group pursuing the optimal solution for its own component of the
car.278  Local, "tacit" knowledge of those down on the shop floor thus
complemented the decisions made by those in management, serving as the
foundation for the optimal product.279
Thus, when transferred to the public sphere, this suggests that
decisions made by means of reasoning through discussion may be even more
effective than those made by a mere count of the votes, because they take
into consideration the tacit knowledge of local communities. Like the
components of an automobile, social problems are interlinked in complex
ways, calling for a transfer of experimentalist principles to the public sector
in such a way as to keep regulation of society and the economy attuned to
the needs of its citizen users.
273 See id. at 303.
274 See Randall Peerenboom, Globalization, Path Dependency and the Limits of Law: Administrative
Law Reform and Rule of Law in the People's Republic of China, 19 BERKELEY J. INTL L. 161,253 (2001).
27,See Michael C. Doff & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98
COLUM. L. REv. 267, 316-322 (1998). This approach to government deregulation is inspired by Japanese
industrial management techniques, and thus takes lessons from corporate management to help reconstruct
government administration efforts. Id. at 286.
276 Id. at 320.
277 Doff and Sabel refer to Mary P. Follet, who emphasized early on that, "[y]ou cannot establish
democratic control by legislation ... ; there is only one way to get democratic control-by people learning
how to evolve collective ideas." See id. at 415 n.468 (quoting MARY P. FOLLETr, THE NEW STATE 159
(1918) (emphasis added)).
278 For an account of this process, see Allen Ward et al., The Second Toyota Paradox: How Delaying
Decisions Can Make Better Cars Faster, SLOAN MGMT. REv. 43, 43-61 (1995).
279 Id. at 267.
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B. An Experimentalist Vision for Re-Aligning Pro-Growth Coalitions
It has been difficult for displaced residents like the ones in the
Shenyang case to go to court and insist on direct enforcement of their
property rights. The ideological dilemma plaguing China today is that
enforcing property rights of the type recognized in the United States in effect
provides for "natural restitution" of land.28 ° In other words, wholesale
adoption of the U.S. system would force China to recognize more than just
use rights, but also rights in the land itself. In turn, this would require the
governing regime to collapse and streamline the "bundle of rights," and pave
the way for individuals to request return of property nationalized by the
State.281 Such a path toward privatization of land would call into question
the very Marxist roots underlying Chinese society and Party legitimacy.
A shift in reform efforts, to focus on the core of the Party's mandate-
service in the interest of the people-would not undermine the rights
movement. To the contrary, rights are significant precisely because they
allow individuals to participate and associate in the deliberative process.
Under a republican theory, which formed the basis of the American
Revolution and Lockean liberalism:
[Tihe power to take property for public use rests, not on the
government's right to exact support from subjects without their
consent, but instead on the rights of all the people in the society.
The majority may rightfully do only what the people can
rightfully do unanimously. 282
Shifting the focus of reform to incorporate a stronger theory of agency
into eminent domain jurisprudence would reaffirm the relevance of the
"whole people," while at the same time allowing the Party to effectively
recapture legitimacy and quell the social unrest stirred by recent public land
scandals. What this new theory requires is a strengthening of land
administration to distinguish between government acting in the public
interest, to carry out its police powers, versus government acting in self-
interest, to profit from back-door transactions. Only where the government
is genuinely acting in the public interest should it enjoy the powers and
immunities inherent in its sovereignty.
280 See Pham, supra note 23, at 12 n.33 and accompanying text.
281 id.
282 Timothy Sandefur, A Natural Rights Perspective on Eminent Domain in California: A Rationale
for Meaningful Judicial Scrutiny of "Public Use, " 32 Sw. U. L. REV. 569,584 (2003).
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By focusing on outcome-based solutions (essentially the model of
compensatory takings provided by the United States), the reform effort in
China has left out due process considerations not provided for elsewhere in
the property framework. A government-as-agent theory of reform would
respect the rights of the average citizen, borrowing from the law on
corporations to build transparency and accountability into the process of
land administration. This model provides for a process of monitoring and
access to records, which would hold regulators accountable as fiduciaries of
28the people. 83 In addition, it recognizes that local communities are also
stakeholders in development projects, soliciting their feedback and
authorization on actions taken by the government officials who serve as their
284agents. As in any corporation, a fiduciary with a vested interest in the
transaction awaiting approval would have to recuse himself from the
ultimate decision approving or denying that transaction.
This model is consistent with Party notions of the leadership as the
vanguard of the people and is to some extent already being implemented on
a limited basis in China. Gang Zanchun, director of the Legal Affairs
Department of SLAB, relates that his agency broke through a deadlock on
proposed regulations regarding the requisition of rural land by publishing the
full draft for public comment and conducting seminars with local
285peasants. SLAB bureaucrats ultimately took into account the peasants'
desire to establish clear and detailed rules in the drafting of the regulations,
in place of provisions allowing for broad discretion.286
While such willingness to factor in citizen perspectives may be rare,
and the norm is that "drafters, despite extensive solicitation for public
comment and consultation, may decide not to take the comments on
283 In the case cited in the introduction, Connecticut law mandated that multiple and specific details
be provided in the development plan, including a statement of the number of jobs to be created, a
marketability plan, a financing plan, an administrative plan, and a finding that the plan will contribute to the
economic welfare of the municipality and the state. Kelo Resp. Brief, supra note 249, at 43. Such
requirements seem to lend transparency and provide potential benchmarks for measuring whether the plan
would actually be in the public interest.
284 Upon initial approval by the city council, the development company in the Connecticut case began
a series of neighborhood meetings to educate the residents about the development process. See id. at 4.
It issued notice through newspaper advertisements, direct mail and public announcements at city council
meetings, to encourage residence attendance and participation. See id. A total of six neighborhood
meetings were held between April and October 1998, and a subsequent environmental impact evaluation
was completed only after a mandatory forty-five-day public comment period. See id. at 4-6.
285 Peter Howard Come, Creation and Application of Law in the PRC, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 369, 387
(2002) (citing Gang Zanchun, Remarks at the Conference on Implications for Chinese Administrative Law
of China's Accession to the WTO, China National School of Administration and the Asia Foundation (July
27-29, 2001)).
286 id.
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board,' 287 there is potential for this to change with increased codification of
the concept of citizen participation by right. The city of Qingdao, in
Shandong Province, recently took an unprecedented step toward this goal in
passing a circular that requires developers to reach agreement with at least
ninety-five percent of affected residents in order to obtain a demolition and
construction permit.28 Such legislation reflects growing recognition of the
significance of obtaining advance approval (shouken289) from those affected,
as an ex ante solution to the problems faced.
Urban planning experts have pointed to other successful experimental
efforts, including a project in the southern seaport city of Quanzhou, in
Fujian Province, in which resident involvement was incorporated into the
earliest stages of the neighborhood planning processes for both city-center
historic preservation and public space upgrading. 290 This project
culminated in several weeks of community planning workshops, a public
exhibition of separate interest group visions for development, and a
conference on "Democratization of the Urban Planning Decision-making
Process." 291 One reason local communities were brought into the
Quanzhou development process was that planning professionals had
expressed a desire to incorporate the character of the local community into
292their designs.
Municipal authorities have also called on professionals to consult on
district plans that they regard as contrary to the interests of the city or to the
293preferences of the municipal government. One such professional has
argued that these expert consultants function as an intervening party to the
pro-growth coalition, and are better suited to represent the interests of the
community, because they are themselves urban residents of various
professions. 294  By allowing the decisions made by expert consultants to at
times overrule those made by districts, SOEs or street committees, 295 this
287 id.
288 See Qingdao Shi Dui Chengshi Fangwu Chaiqian Jinxing Yange Guanli [City of Qingdao
Embarks on Strict Campaign of Administration over Urban Housing Demolition], THE BEIJING NEWS,
available at http://www.thebeijingnews.com/news/2005/0310/06@010845.html (last visited June 8, 2005).
289 See id.
290 See Daniel Abramson, Planning for Community and Planning with Community in China: Lessons
from Quanzhou, Thoughts on Beijing, Remarks at Harvard-MIT Symposium on Planning for Continuity
and Change in Urban China (Apr. 24, 2004), available at http://courses.washington.edu/quanzhou (last
visited June 8, 2005).
291 Id.
292 See Daniel Abramson, Michael Leaf & Tan Ying, Social Research and the Localization of Chinese
Urban Planning Practice: Some Ideas from Quanzhou, Fujian, in THE NEW CHINESE CITY: GLOBALIZATION
AND MARKET REFORM 167 (John Legal ed. 2002).
293 See Zhang, Decentralization, supra note 61, at 319.
294 See id. at 319-320.
295 Id. at 319.
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process builds in an extra layer of monitoring over those parties with
otherwise partial interests.
The Quanzhou project provides an excellent model for other Chinese
cities. There, local officials established a plan of action and then consulted
service providers (the urban development experts) on both its design and
296implementation. In true democratic experimentalist fashion, the service
providers solicited feedback from affected citizens, thus linking the officials
with knowledge from the community. Thereafter, they engaged in a
process of "simultaneous engineering," through which they were able to
continuously propose changes to the provisional design based on their
newfound experiences and needs. "Benchmarking" occurred along each
step of the way and entailed pooling of information from the experiment
itself with information from similar experiments.297 The final steps in the
process were error correction and "learning by monitoring. 298
This is not meant to imply that democratic experimentalism has now
become the postmodem solution to administering the property market in a
China still chasing after modernization. At present, the pro-growth
coalition still overshadows the other two components of the development
quadrant, which consists of government, developer, expert consultants and
common citizens. 299  Expert consulting, limited to individual development
projects rather than comprehensive development strategies3°° and called
upon only on occasion, still appears to operate only at the margins. More
importantly, the key to effective citizen participation is a revitalization of the
community unit, which has unfortunately been weighed down by history and
politics, and is thus fraught with its own challenges.3 °i
296 For a more detailed discussion of how the Quanzhou project proceeded, see Abramson et al., supra
note 292.
297 See id. at 287.
298 id.
299 See generally Zhang, Urban Development, supra note 5.
300 Zhang, Decentralization, supra note 61, at 320.
301 David Westendorff, who consults for the Ford Foundation and has been involved in its work in
Quanzhou, posits that one reason resident committees have suffered from low levels of legitimacy may be
because of the past involvement of community groups in repressive functions. See DAVID WESTENDORFF,
UNITED NATIONS, RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR SOcIAL DEVELOPMENT, UNEASY PARTNERSHIPS BETWEEN CITY
HALL AND CITIZENS (1998), available at http://www.unhabitat.org/istanbul+5/pe30.htm (last visited June 8,
2005).
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C. An Experimentalist Vision for Democratizing the Urban Renewal
Process
The pivotal question in China really becomes whether the community
unit can be utilized effectively enough to give meaning to due process, as
envisioned by theorists of democratic experimentalism. One China scholar
has questioned whether the ideals of the theory can be reconciled with the
Chinese system of democratic centralism, in which the center makes the
final decision and maintains tight control over a fledgling civil society.302
Furthermore, continuous re-engineering and questioning of the existing
structure "co-exists uneasily with the more dogmatic aspect of socialism that
insists on a single scientifically correct solution and unification of thought
around the Party line. 30 3
Democratic experimentalism does not seem quite so contrary to the
Party's general approach, when viewed in tandem with the central
government's current practice of engaging in incremental reform. At
present, it is not unusual for specific localities "earmarked for reform" to
pass regulations without an equivalent at the national level, meant to serve as
"models" for broader reform should they prove successful. 3°4 In the past,
Shenzhen functioned as such a "first step" testing ground for laws adopted
from the Hong Kong legal system.30 5 Currently, a favored location for the
testing of legislation is Shanghai,0 6 and municipal governments elsewhere
typically benchmark their own attempts at reform against examples from the
Shanghai experience.
Shanghai reflects an increasingly urbanized China, in which the
homeowner rate is high and municipal housing departments, stretched for
resources and unable to compete, must often leave the business of housing
307
services to the property owners themselves. It is a realistic model of
reform developed on China's own soil, and convincingly argues for
enhancement of due process and reaffirmation of the public interest in urban
planning. One researcher from the anthropology department at Sun Yat-sen
University in Guangzhou conducted a study that revealed that the heightened
consciousness that so often gives rise to broader social movement already
exists among urban residents in Shanghai: "Faced with a wide range of
growing problems such as pollution, forced resettlement, and land
302 See Peerenboom, supra note 274, at 255-256.
303 Id. at 256.
301 Come, supra note 285, at 425.
305 id.
'o' Id. at 426.
3w See Zhang, Decentralization, supra note 61, at 317-18.
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confiscation, [they] not only complain to the local government but also get
organized and take collective actions to defend their residential rights."308
The study further shows that the measured success of residents in
Shanghai's Green Garden New Village in protecting their own interests had
much to do with the ability to align with nongovernmental parties and form a
rights-based coalition. 30 9  This rights-based coalition counter-balanced the
pro-growth coalition formed by capitalist developers and technocratic
government, without seeking to overturn and replace the latter.3t ° Instead,
the work of the rights-based coalition linked directly to that of the pro-
growth coalition-namely through the relationship linking residents, as
common citizens, to government, as representative of the people.31' Just as
important as the alliances they formed with nongovernmental parties, then,
was the nexus residents re-established between themselves and the
government.
When first confronted in 1993 by a real estate developer's plans to
build in the middle of their community park, Green Garden's residents
capitalized on the government's recent efforts to promote legal reform and
the rule of law, arguing that:
The land belongs to the [S]tate. But the representative of
the [S]tate is not the government but the law. Law stipulates
that the using right of green land belongs to the home owners
and not to the Street [Committee]. So the government's action
violates the law. It does not serve the people .... We are the
people, and we stand on the side of the [S]tate. We... are not
against the [SItate, but just protecting our interest (bu fandui
guojia, zhi baohu ziji de liyi)."'
This type of residential rights discourse brought to light conflicts
inherent in the chaotic bureaucratic structure of land administration, making
apparent the differing objectives of local government agencies such as the
Urban Construction Committee (focused on the district's economic growth)
and the Bureau of Urban Planning (focused on environmental protection).
It questioned whether government actions in support of the developer were
308 Jiangang Zhu, Not Against the State, Just Protecting the Residents' Interests: A Residents'
Movement in a Shanghai Neighborhood, 5 PERSPECTIVES 25 (2004), available at http://www.oycf.org/
perspectives/26_093004/4_ZhuJiangang-shanghai.pdf (last visited June 8, 2005).
9 id. at 26.
310 Id. at 38.
311 Id.
312 Id. at 34.
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truly "representative of the [S]tate ''313 and, combined with complaints to
Beijing and the media, cast the local residents into the sympathetic role of
victims suffering illegal confiscation.
The most ingenious element of this residential rights discourse was its
incorporation of an "authentication strategy" (jiao zhen), aimed at holding
government and officials to full compliance with laws and regulations, even
in the face of their failure to enforce such laws. 314  By appealing to the
Constitution's stipulation that "all power belongs to the people," for example,
and insisting that the government should respect the wishes of residents
because they are "the people," the engineers of this strategy made it difficult
for the government to refuse their complaints directly.315 By doing so, the
government would have blatantly expressed a disregard for its own
obligation to the masses.
Green Garden residents were careful not to hold officials culpable for
the conflict, leaving developers as their main target of grievance. As a
result, "at most [the conflict would] be regarded as a 'conflict between an
enterprise and the masses' (chang-qun maodun), not as a political conflict
between the people and the [S]tate.' ' 16  By creating this marked delineation
between the government, on one hand as protector of the people, and the
developer, on the other hand as wrongdoer, Green Garden residents helped
disincentivize the typically quasi-public nature of government-developer
alliances. Officials were able to redeem themselves without answering to
media scrutiny or criminal sanction and could work on the side of the
residents to reach an outcome more equitably balanced, because it now
aligned government interests with the public interest.
317
A case such as Green Garden ultimately met with only limited
success, 318 indicating that "bottom-up" movements, initiated and driven
largely by local residents, continue to face difficulties--even in Shanghai.
Although they involve greater community input than the more passive
process of conducting opinion surveys, or soliciting public comment, they
do not constitute meaningful public participation, because they are
conducted only on informal, and often isolated, bases. Legal mechanisms
that formally institutionalize participation need to supplement such efforts
and be incorporated into urban planning statutes for these grassroots
313 Id. at 30, 36.
314 Id. at 30.
315 id.
316 Id. at 31.
317 See id. at 32-35.
318 See generally id. (tracing the various successes, as well as failures, of the Green Garden residents).
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movements to truly succeed.3t 9  China's recent reforms have been a step in
the right direction, but still fail to provide meaningful avenues for
challenging plans that seem to be contrary to the public interest.
The real key may be in statutes such as the one enacted by Shanghai
in 1997, which prescribes that homeowners should be represented by their
own committees, rather than relying on quasi-public residents committees, in
negotiations with development companies. 320 Such legislation is
organizational-based and lays the foundation upon which residents may
launch the fight for their rights. By empowering residents to choose
representatives accountable to their own local communities, rather than to
the local government, this type of legislation helps to ensure that ownership
and possession of property actually mean something to residents-and will
not just disappear with one swing of the almighty bulldozer.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Wuhan residents who took their complaints to the central
government in Beijing were placed under house arrest as part of a desperate
sweep of petitioners flocking to the capital every year around the October 1
National Day, commemorating the liberation and transfer of modem China
321into communist hands. Much like the Jiahe residents, these countryside
residents eventually took their case far away, to university-based legal aid
lawyers who would be more likely and better equipped than other
322practitioners to help their clients in a fight for social justice. During
meetings, they pressed not only for a level of compensation more just and
reasonable than the nominal amounts they were forced to accept, but also for
a declaration from the court that the process of eviction and demolition had
been conducted illegally.
323
The World Bank's policy on involuntary resettlement demands that in
projects requiring eviction, "[d]isplaced persons should be meaningfully
consulted and should have opportunities to participate in planning and
implementing resettlement programs." 324 The mechanism of land
319 See WESTENDORFF, supra note 301.
320 See Zhu, supra note 308, at 28.
321 See Spring Notes, supra note 4.
322 For more discussion of this topic, see Pamela N. Phan, Clinical Legal Education in China: In
Pursuit of a Culture of Law and a Mission of Social Justice, 9 YALE Hum. RTs. & DEV. L. (forthcoming
Summer 2005).
323 Ultimately, the complaint that they filed omits a request for compensation and asks only for
reimbursement of court fees, along with a declaration by the court that the eviction and demolition were
conducted unlawfully. See Bill of Complaint, supra note 1.324 See Davis & Lin Hai, supra note 167, at 38 (citing to World Bank Operational Policy on
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management in China remains vulnerable to the trappings of quasi-public
alliances, which distort the priorities of local officials and align them with
commercial developers rather than the public they are charged with serving.
The result has been rampant corruption, leading to public outrage and unrest.
Recent reform measures adopted in response to these problems have failed
to, and in some cases exacerbate, the underlying tensions, without
recognizing what the World Bank made apparent in its policy.
Effective reform needs to reaffirm what is meant by the "public
interest" and the government's role in serving that public interest. It should
incorporate community participation into the process of urban renewal and
enable residents to engage the government in a residential rights discourse
when the process falters. Only by default should reform efforts focus on
compensation for forced evictions, as the means for redistributing justice.
Such an outcome-based solution to the problem of a weak property rights
infrastructure merely patches the faqade, without reinforcing the foundation
upon which China's continued growth rests.
In reforming property rights and the mechanism of land management,
it may take continual adjustment, in the tradition of democratic
experimentalism, to truly revitalize local communities and bring civil rights
awareness to the average citizen (tigao gongmin yishi). China does not
benefit from a vibrant civil society and is instead burdened by a Cultural
Revolution history of lawlessness through collective action, which creates
lingering skepticism about the collective's motivation and capacity for
representing individual interests. Moreover, in deregulating, the central
government has created an administrative apparatus that discounts market
mechanisms, even as the nation as a whole moves toward marketization.
Local officials continue to enjoy immunity for wrongdoing by quasi-public
entities, while simultaneously claiming credit for urban renewal projects
within their jurisdiction. Under these circumstances, it becomes doubly
hard for trust and awareness to be built.
The lessons learned from China are lessons that apply widely, to teach
about the inadequacy of postmodern responses to the modern regulatory
state. As states and the business of development grow, they tend to grow
on the backs of the poor and the marginalized. In evaluating a society's
commitment to democratic institutions, one must question whether the
advantages of developing the local economy or renewing the urban
community necessarily trickle down to operate in the interests of the public-
at-large. As pointed out in briefs currently being reviewed by the U.S.
Involuntary Resettlement, OP 4.12: Involuntary Resettlement, Dec. 2001, para. 2(b)).
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Supreme Court, the use of eminent domain for economic development runs
the risk of collapsing public use into private takings-particularly where it
fails to consider the interests of the individual property owners.32  If the
dangers are ignored, and the tools simultaneously provided by legislatures
and the courts prove ineffective, "[t]he rich may not inherit the earth, but
they most assuredly will inherit the means to acquire any part of it they
desire. 326
Property law scholars have noted that property is not about
relationships of people to things-it is about relationships among people
with respect to things.327  Wherever it is that the battle for land is being
fought, and the right to economic and social liberties being contested, rights
over property must continue to honor what is rightfully possessed by the
individual-and keep out even the king.
325 See Kelo App. Brief, supra note 228, at 17.
326 id.
327 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY ch. 1, introductory note (1936) (using this definition of
property).
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